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ABSTRACT

Throughout the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, Venice played a direct role in
shaping the future of Northeastern Italy. The standing scholarship views Venetian
involvement on the mainland as either an abandonment of the city’s maritime tradition or
as a buffer zone against rival powers, like Milan. Venice’s western mainland empire,
Terraferma, provided Venice with many commercial products that the Eastern
Mediterranean did not. One mainland product, timber, was a central focus of Venetian
expansion into Terraferma and has thus far been neglected by historians. This thesis
argues that the Venetian Republic manipulated mainland legal traditions in order to
obtain direct control over the forest resources of Terraferma.
The pressures placed upon Venice by timber shortages and rival powers in the
fourteenth and fifteenth centuries instigated a departure from Venice’s passive
management of mainland cities and encouraged the city to strengthen its defenses through
territorial expansion and forest conservation policies. Timber acquired from Terraferma
was one of the vital sinews that bound the Venetian military and mercantile machine
together. In order to directly control the mainland’s timber resources, the Venetians
inserted their usufructory claims into the legal traditions of mainland communities.
Archival sources and primary histories illustrate that Venetian forest policy
evolved from cordial requests for timber into legal statutes that controlled local
communities’ access to timber stands. The fall of Constantinople in 1453 and Negroponte
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in 1471 opened a window of opportunity, into which the Venetians inserted the mainland
legal concept of “right to reserve,” diritto di reserva, in order to expand and formalize
their legal claims to Terraferma common forestland. The promulgation of six forest laws
in 1476 punctuated the development of Venetian forest law in the fifteenth century. The
laws governed the usage of forest resources and placed the Venetians in direct control of
all of Terraferma’s community forests.
The Venetians answered the question “Who owns the forest?” through the
development of forest laws that placed timber ownership directly with a centralized
government. The question easily expands into “Who owns the land, and all of its natural
resources?” American natural resource managers and NGOs continue to develop the
American answer to the question. The Venetian forest narrative provides us with one
possible answer to the question that elicits further conversations. Understanding Venice’s
domination of mainland cities for ship-timber may also elicit further insight into how and
why modern states dominate their neighbors for natural resources.
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INTRODUCTION

“Venice invincible, the Adriatic wonder, admired of all the world for power and
glory, whom no ambitious force could yet bring under, is here presented…”
~ Maurice Kiffen (1599) 1
Four warhorses of gilded copper arrayed in the quadriga stand as proud sentinels
of St. Mark’s Square. The horses symbolize much more than a piece of inspiring art for
visitors within St. Mark’s Basilica. Their story is the story of Venice. St. Mark’s horses,
like Venice, began their journey as a Byzantine possession. The saffron chargers
witnessed the apex and collapse of the Byzantine Empire. The Venetians captured the
quadriga from Constantinople’s Hippodrome when crusaders sacked the city in 1204 C.E.
The horses most likely originated on the Island of Chios and symbolized Byzantine
control over the Aegean Islands and the larger Hellenic world.
As the Classical embodiment of victory, the horses are not only a symbol of
Venice’s liberation from the Byzantines, but also symbolize Venice’s replacement of
Constantinople as the dominant force in the Eastern Mediterranean. Warfare and
commerce produced St. Mark’s horses and the Venetian Empire. Venice dominated the
Adriatic and the Eastern Mediterranean in the fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries by
controlling the waters of the Adriatic and the Eastern Mediterranean. Secure mainland
supplies of timber contributed to the maintenance of Venetian maritime power.

1

Gasparo Contarini, The Common-Wealth and Gouernment of Venice, trans. Lewes Lukanor (London:
Imprinted by John Windet for Edmund Mattes, 1599), 4.
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Safeguarding stands of timber required Venice to establish a land-based empire that
dominated mainland polities. Yet, the prevailing historical scholarship grants the basis of
Renaissance Venetian power to its eastern maritime empire. 2
Venice’s Aegean and Adriatic possessions were an essential part of the
Republic’s empire, but this limited focus on Venice’s vast web of eastern maritime
possessions leaves out a part of the Venetian narrative. Venetian scholarship highlights
Venice’s naval empire and neglects its role in shaping Northern Italian history.
Terraferma, Venice’s western mainland empire, provided Venice with many commercial
products that the Eastern Mediterranean did not. One of the more important Terraferma
products was ship-grade timber for the Arsenale. Most of the existing historical
scholarship on Venetian Terraferma views Venice’s expansion onto the mainland as an
extension of the Republic’s political and commercial power, yet it was also an extension
of Venetian legal tradition.
The Venetian annexation of mainland polities did not grant Venice direct control
of Terraferma timber supplies. The incorporation of a timber polity into Terraferma
reaffirmed the Arsenale’s usufructory rights to a given city’s timber and laid the
foundation for future legal claims. The Venetians began to move towards directly
controlling the timber resources of Terraferma in the early fifteenth century by
establishing a legal precedent for the Arsenale’s claim to timber. Venice ultimately
gained legal control of Terraferma common forests by building upon this legal precedent
and by using the advance of the Ottoman Empire to invoke the “right to reserve” (Dirrito

2

Roger Crowley, City of Fortune: How Venice Ruled the Seas (New York: Random House, 2011); F. C.
Lane, Venice: A Maritime Republic (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973).

3
di reserva) forest stands for the defense of Terraferma’s liberty. Venetian acquisitions of
mainland common timberlands came at the expense of local inhabitants, but resulted in
positive forest conservation measures.
Several Venetian specialists successfully illustrated how the Venetians interacted
with their natural environment. 3 Historians tend to focus on Venice’s unquestionable
connection to water. Water is a contradictory element for Venice and historians
acknowledge that the Venetian natural environment is defined by hydrological
dichotomies. 4 The lagoons simultaneously provided the Venetians with a constant sense
of anxiety and an overwhelming feeling of security. The acqua alta, or “high water,”
periodically flooded the city, whereas the lagoons also provided the city with its strongest
defense against land-based assaults.
However, submerged under Venice and within the historical scholarship is a
natural resource that also molded the Venetian narrative. Timber in the form of wooden
stilts provides the foundation for Venice. It was one of several natural resources that
supported the Venetian Empire. Wood was quite simply the undisputed monarch of
natural resources in the preindustrial age. 5 Timber acquired from Terraferma was one of
the vital sinews that bound the Venetian military and mercantile machine together. Yet,
few scholars acknowledge Venice’s dependency on wood products and even fewer

3

F. C. Lane, Venetian Ships and Shipbuilders of the Renaissance (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University
Press, 1934); Elisabeth Crouzet-Pavan, Venise Triomphante: Les Horizons d’un mythe (Seyssel: Les
editions Champ Vallon, 1997); Karl Appuhn, A Forest on the Sea: Environmental Expertise in Renaissance
Venice (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009).
4

The most prominent studies on the Venetian perception of water can be found in the collection edited by
C. A. Fletcher and T. Spencer, Flooding and Environmental Challenges for Venice and its Lagoon: State of
Knowledge (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).

5

Karl Appuhn, “Environmental Politics and State Power in early modern Venice, 1300–1650” (PhD
dissertation, Northwestern University, 1999).
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examine the role ship-timber played in the development and maintenance of the Venetian
empire.
Terraferma refers to the Venetian mainland territories between the Adda River in
the west and the Julian March. It is the term historians employ to refer to Venice’s
mainland Italian possessions. Terraferma is simply an abbreviation of the Venetian title
Domini di Terraferma, “the mainland dominions.” Venice’s Italian mainland possessions
centered north of the Po River formed the bulk of Terraferma. The lucrative eastern trade
routes certainly filled Venetian coffers, yet timber served as the vector of Venetian
commerce. Establishing that Venice acquired most of its ship-timber from Terraferma
provides some insight into the Venetian mind. 6 An exploration of Venice’s motivations
for establishing Terraferma, coupled with studying how Venice dominated periphery
polities for ship-timber, reveals a corpus of forest law and a form of governmental control
of a natural resource that were unparalleled throughout Renaissance Italy.
Venice’s forest control is unparalleled among the Italian maritime republics
because no other Italian power succeeded at manipulating forest law and designating
forest reserves as successfully as the Venetians. The four maritime republics of Italy,
Venice, Genoa, Pisa, and Amalfi depended upon timber for securing and defending
commercial ties throughout the Mediterranean. The Genoese Republic did not control its
sting of forests along the Ligurian coast and relied upon private shipbuilders for their
naval needs. 7 Amalfi controlled portions of the timber market, but the relative aridity of

6

The existing Venetian forest history scholarship clearly establishes that it was highly likely that Venetian
timber supplies came from Terraferma and Istria: cf. Appuhn, A Forest on the Sea; Lane, Venetian Ships;
Russell Mieggs, Trees and Timber in the Ancient Mediterranean World (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1982); and John Perlin, A Forest Journey (New York: W. W. Norton, 1989).
7

Appuhn, A Forest on the Sea, 31–32.
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Campania limited local timber supplies. 8 Even during Pisa’s era of naval dominance in
the eleventh century, the Pisans did not designate timber reserves to conquered regions.
Pisa concerned itself with the export of timber to wealthy Islamic ports on the Northern
African coast in the Levant. 9
Focusing on Venetian forest policy in Terraferma is an excellent avenue for
studying Italian Renaissance natural resource management for several reasons. The
breadth of available primary sources is a major consideration for studying Venice. Both
Pisa and Amalfi based their commercial livelihood on maritime trade and required
supplies of timber for ship construction, but would be less suitable for an inquiry into
timber management techniques because of the lack of primary accounts of forest laws
and policies. Venetian forest history is well documented in the Venetian State Archives
(Archivio di Stato di Venezia, henceforth referred to as ASV), mainland communal
archives, and in numerous primary sources. 10
Secondly, Terrraferma forest regulation is an example of preindustrial natural
resource conservation that contributes to the established environmental historical
scholarship. Many environmental histories are modern histories that strictly examine the
exertion of economic pressures upon environmental systems. William Cronon examined
how American capitalism shaped Colonial New England’s environment, and Carolyn

8

Tommaso Astarita, Between Salt Water and Holy Water: A History of Southern Italy (New York: W. W.
Norton and Company, 2006), 62.

9

David Jacoby, Commercial Exchange across the Mediterranean: Byzantium, the Crusader Levant, Egypt,
and Italy (Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing, 2005), 106.

10
The best records of Venice’s forest history can be found in: Amministrazione Forestale Veneta 1116–
1811, Fondo IT ASVe 0615 003, Archivio di Stato di Venezia, Venice; and the Esecutori delle
Deliberazioni Senato del Terra, Fondo IT ASVe 0710, Archivio di Stato di Venezia, Venice.

6
Merchant illustrated capitalism’s role in the mechanization of America’s environment. 11
As Karl Appuhn successfully argues, this capitalistic interpretation does not apply well to
Renaissance Venice. 12 He argues that this capitalistic interpretation blames western
rationalism for wide-spread environmental change throughout the world and in colonial
enterprises. Venice provides an example of environmental change wrought by
modifications to legal codes prior to the rise of western rationalism.
Alfred Crosby called for an ecological explanation for environmental change in
the “Neo-Europes.” 13 Crosby asserted that the Europeans conquered the “Neo-Europes”
through ecological imperialism. Crosby challenged environmental historians to
contemplate how biological agents modified nature. The scientific rationale is an
important aspect of environmental change, but the modification of environmental systems
is a combination of ecological and cultural factors. Law is another expression of culture
that directly influences nature. Venice’s seizure of Terraferma’s ship-timber was a form
of legal imperialism through the enactment of legal statutes that placed restraints on
forest usage by Terraferma polities. Such a notion makes Venice not only an intriguing
case study, but also a study that contributes to more clearly established environmental
narratives.
Lastly, Venice’s unique geography required the Venetians to modify their natural
surroundings from the foundation of the city. The Venetian Lagoon’s role as the estuary

11

William Cronon, Changes in the Land: Indians, Colonists, and the Ecology of New England (New York:
Macmillan, 1983); Carolyn Merchant, Ecological Revolutions: Nature, Gender, and Science in New
England (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1989).

12
13

Appuhn, “Environmental Politics,” 11.

Alfred Crosby, Ecological Imperialism: The Biological Expansion of Europe, 900–1900 2E (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 2004).
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of the Sile and Brenta rivers and its position as a bay within the Adriatic posed
hydrological obstacles throughout Venetian history. The Venetian Republic’s survival
rested solely upon the city’s ability to control the hydrology of the lagoons and the Po
River watershed. Venetian environmental policy was directly tied into the livelihood of
the city. The Venetians often implemented timber in order to solve the dangers of living
in the middle of an ever-changing, live hydrological system. Timber was one of several
crucial natural resources that Venice dominated in order to sustain its insular position.
The control of wheat and salt also played a prominent role in the maintenance of the
Venetian Empire, but as of yet, no historian has examined how Venice manipulated legal
tradition to control timber.
This new legal history of Venice’s timber resources follows the accepted
chronology of the Venetian Empire, but ends with Venice’s legal domination of all
common Terraferma timberland in 1476. The chronology of the Venetian empire is
typically organized into three different phases. The first phase (1204-1380) is defined by
Venice’s expansion of influence over the Adriatic. Venice’s involvement in the
dismantlement of the Byzantine Empire in 1204 cemented Venice as an international
power. Economic rivalry with Genoa dominated the narrative after 1204. This
antagonism between Genoa and Venice resulted in the War of Chioggia in 1378. The
victory over the Genoese in 1380 granted Venice control over the Adriatic and Eastern
Mediterranean whilst severely handicapping the naval capabilities of their staunchest
rival. The War of Chioggia served as a springboard for Venetian expansion onto the
Italian mainland and Venice’s eventual control of timber resources.

8
A long fifteenth century (1380–1509) serves as the focal point of the second
phase of Venetian history. Venice departed from its passive management of the mainland
by the execution of the Carraresi in 1406. This demonstrated Venice’s commitment to the
security of the mainland and its timber resources. Venice extended its control over
Terraferma with the annexation of Bergamo in 1428. The Venetian expansion into
Terraferma incited anxiety in other mainland powers. Florence, Milan, and Hungaria all
came into direct conflict with Venice over its expansion onto the mainland. This anxiety
culminated with the War of the League of Cambrai in 1509. Although not covered in this
thesis, the third phase of Venetian imperial history began in 1509 and extended to the war
of Candia and the loss of Crete to the Ottoman Empire in the 1570s.
The development of Venetian forest law centers upon Venice’s conquest of
Terraferma and the development of mainland forest law in the late fourteenth through the
fifteenth century. Venetian forest policy provides scholarship with a unique periodization
of Venetian Terraferma. This inquiry divides the narrative of Venetian Terraferma into
two periods. I begin with how conflict with Genoa and surrounding rival states
encouraged Venice to promulgate the earliest forms of timber management in the middle
of the fourteenth century. The work then transitions into an overview of the Venetian
conquest of Terraferma between 1378 and 1428. The steady growth of Venetian
intervention into mainland affairs dominates the narrative. The promulgation of forest
law was part of a larger pattern of increasing Venetian influence over the mainland. The
execution of the Carraresi family in 1406 serves as the turning point for the first chapter
and clearly marks the beginning of Venice’s commitment to Terraferma. The annexation

9
of Bergamo in 1428 established the boundaries of Terraferma and concluded the first
period of Venetian forest history.
The second section of Venetian forest history serves as the focus of the third
chapter of this thesis. This section is defined by the development and implementation of
Venetian forest policy between 1410 and 1476. Firm transition dates must be used with
caution, yet 1410 marks the beginning of Venice’s attempt to directly control
Terraferma’s ship-timber supplies. Venetian forest policy evolved from cordial requests
for timber into legal statutes that controlled local communities’ access to timber stands.
Doge Michele Steno first requested timber from Belluno in 1410. Venetian timber policy
evolved into six 1476 forest laws that directly controlled how local communities could
use forest resources.
This thesis is divided into three parts. The first section examines the Venetian
expansion into Terraferma in the late fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries. The
annexation of Terraferma polities did not grant full authority over timber resources to the
Venetians. The Roman legal tradition of the mainland required the Venetians to insert
their timber interests into mainland legal codes, thus the second part of this thesis
examines how Venetian forest policy and law developed to control the timber supplies of
Venice’s newfound mainland empire. The brief conclusion reveals how this thesis might
inform future research and proposes that the Venetian forest law possesses valuable
lessons for modern forest users and policymakers.
*******************
Ship-timber was a constant military necessity for Venice and its state-operated
shipyard, the Arsenale. Although Arsenale-grade timber came from Istria and the

10
Dalmatian coast, Terraferma stands supplied Venice with most of its ship-timber. 14
Therefore, Venice’s military expansion into Terraferma is the appropriate starting point
for examining the Republic’s system of state controlled forests. The Venetian push onto
the Italian mainland in the early fifteenth century was likely due, in part, to a need of
steady timber supplies for the Arsenale. The requirement of a steady supply of Arsenalegrade timber may not have been the most crucial reason, and certainly was not the only
driving force behind the Venetian expansion into Terraferma. Yet, the historical
discussion on Terraferma has thus far excluded timber.
Unlike capitalism in New England or biological colonization in the Neo-Europes,
the Venetian Republic’s control of ship-timber resources illustrates how the decline of
natural resources does not have to possess negative undertones. Venice provides an
example of a society that noticed deforestation and attempted to implement positive
conservation policies. My discussion of Venice’s conquest of Terraferma will be
followed by an inquiry into how Venice inserted its interests in timber into the
Terraferma’s legal heritage. Venice secured stands of Arsenale-grade timber largely
through enacting environmental public policy. Shortages of Terraferma timber
throughout the fourteenth and into the early fifteenth century resulted in the opening of a
policy window. 15 Venetian forest policy was a progressive attempt by an Italian Republic

14
15

Lane, Venetian Ships, 224–226; cf. Appuhn, A Forest on the Sea, 44.

A policy window or window of opportunity is a phase of policy formulation. A random problem window
is a type of policy window that describes the Venetian timber situation. These occur when a jarring or
traumatic event causes policy-makers to focus their attention on remedying the cause of the calamity. A
good definition comes from Melody Hessing, Michael Howlett, and Tracy Summerville: “random events or
crises open unpredictable windows that can allow opportunities for new actors to influence the policy
formulation process.” Melody Hessing, Michael Howlett, and Tracy Summerville, Canadian Natural
Resource and Environmental Policy: Political Economy and Public Policy (Vancouver: University of
British Columbia Press, 2005), 172.
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to conserve a natural resource for military use that resulted in the creation of Italy’s first
state forest reserves.
The story of St. Mark’s horses closely mirrors the Venetian narrative. Venice’s
preference of a quadriga of horses, terrestrial animals, instead of the traditional animal
that denoted sea power, hippocampi, embodied Venice’s domination of not only the
Eastern Mediterranean, but also the communities of Terraferma and the Po River Valley.
It is quite fitting to mark the ultimate decline of Venetian prominence with the seizure of
the quadriga by French forces in 1797. Ultimately the central purpose of this inquiry is to
examine what modern scholars and policymakers can learn from the Venetian forest
narrative.

12

CHAPTER I: “MUCH NEW GROUND CAN BE WON”:
VENETIAN HISTORIOGRAPHY

This thesis fits into two traditions of Venetian historiography. The first, and
broader of the two traditions, focuses on Venetian Terraferma. Although more Venetian
histories grant the Republic’s maritime ventures primacy, a growing number of histories
strictly examine Venetian Terraferma. The second tradition is the legal history of the
Republic. Venetian legal histories chart the origins of Venice’s legal heritage, and
examine how the Republic applied this heritage within the city itself and to its dominions.
The historiography for Venetian law is quite limited, thus this thesis will contribute forest
law to the greater discussion of Venetian history.
The narrative of Venetian forest law and policy in fourteenth and fifteenth century
Terraferma is also a forest history. The arguments of this thesis contribute to the field of
forest history by illustrating how Venice shaped the ownership of Terraferma forests.
Very few forest histories examine pre-industrial forests and even fewer examine how
legal traditions shaped arboreal ownership. Furthermore, many forest histories illustrate
how ecological processes modify forests whilst neglecting the influence of cultural
systems, such as law.

13
Venice: The Myth and Antimyth
Historians have mused over the city of St. Mark for numerous generations. The
earliest histories of Venice originated in the mediaeval period. 16 Historians penned these
early histories in the classical style and were commissioned by the Venetian patriciate. 17
Written in Latin, very few Venetians held access to the narrative of their own culture.
Although state-sponsored political histories were most common, Marino Sanuto’s late
fifteenth to early sixteenth century Diarii chronicled the daily lives of Venetians from all
ranks in society. The commissioned “official” Venetian histories dominated the Venetian
narrative well into the nineteenth century. 18
The origin of modern Venetian historiography lies with the Venetian histories
written just after the collapse of the Republic in 1797. The opening of the ASV after the
1848 revolutions resulted in a proliferation of Venetian historians. Sameuele Romanin
penned a multi-volume Venetian history in 1861. Romanin, a product of Venice’s
historical Jewish population, is a notable example of a Venetian-born historian defending
the myths of Venice. Romanin viewed the fall of Venice as “an inescapable consequence

16

See for example: Giovanni Diacono, Cronaca Veneziana, ed. Mario de Biasi, 2 vols. (Venice: Ateneo
Veneto, 1988), which is thought to have been written in c. 1053; Andrea Dandolo, Chronicon Venetum,
eds. Ludovico Muratori and Filippo Argelati (Milan: Societas Palatina, 1728), which covers the years
1200–1339 and is believed to have been written in 1339.
17

This is especially the case for: Marc Antonio Coccio “Sabellico,” Rerum Venetarum ab urbe condita libri
(Basel: Joannis König, 1556); Pietro Giustinian, Rerum Venetarum ab urbe condita (Venice: Ludovico
Auantium, 1575); cf. T. Livius, Ab Urbe Condita.

18

Examples of state commissioned historians abound: Marino Sanuto, Diarii, eds. Guglielmo Berchet,
Nicolò Barozzi, and Marco Allegri (Forni: Federico Visenti, 1908) believed to have been written in 1533;
Pietro Bembo, Historiae venetae (Venice: Aldus Fils, 1551); and Paolo Paruta, Historia venetiana (Venice:
Domenico Nicolini, 1605).
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of the autonomies and rights that, regrettably, Venice granted its subjects.” 19 To
Romanin, the Venetians were too benevolent and granted too many rights to annexed
polities. This notion of Venice granting rights to dependent polities is explored further
below within the discussion of Venice’s administration of state forests within its Italian
domains.
F.C. Hodgson published his multi-volume history of Venice in the early twentieth
century. 20 Heinrich Kretschmayr, an Austrian historian, produced three volumes of
Venetian history from 1905 to 1933. 21 Kretshmayr focused on Venetian religion, culture,
industry, and law. His work granted the German-speaking world its initial insight into
Venetian history. The Byzantine historian Charles Diehl published a Venetian History in
French in 1915. Diehl examined the relationship between Venice and its mother city,
Constantinople. 22 Hodgson, Kretshmayr, and Diehl signify the branching out of Venetian
historiography during the early twentieth century.
Hodgson, Kretshmayr, and Diehl all upheld the “myth of Venice.” The myth of
Venice is a form of Venetian exceptionalism. The myth asserts that the Venetian
Republic is a model for all Republics. Likewise, the myth holds that the city strictly
upheld its Republican virtues of liberty, unity, and guardianship. The Venetians
established their city upon maritime capitalism with liberties present in no other Italian

19

Claudio Pavolo, “The Creation of Venetian Historiography,” in Venice Reconsidered: The History and
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city and never witnessed foreign domination. The Venetians were a “unified and civicminded patriciate.” 23 Lastly, the Venetian Republic served as the protector of the liberties
of Terraferma polities. Venice as the protector of the mainland is the most important
concept for this inquiry because the Venetians used their role as guardian of the liberties
of the mainland in order to enact forest law that stripped some of the freedoms previously
enjoyed by mainland cities.
The interpretation of the myth of Venice provided by Venetian histories is divided
into two camps: the historians who bolster the anti-myth and the scholars who support the
myth. The anti-myth camp, established by Vincenzo Marchesi, asserted that the imagery
of the political freedom within the Venetian Empire was false. Marchesi claimed that
Venice behaved like “Italy’s other major powers, that is, in treating the conquered cities
as subjects while leaving them their ancient constitutions and autonomies. The Republic
contented itself with making of the cities friendly subjects but never allowed them to
participate in its life, or never shared power with them.” 24 Marchesi’s interpretation of
the Venetian-Terraferma relationship is a bit hyperbolic, but it is an interpretation that
still holds merit. The Venetians never granted citizenship to the residents of an annexed
polity and only rarely allowed mainland ruling families to become citizens, most notably
Francesco Novello of the Carraresi family.
Pompeo Molmenti, a native Venetian, established the other camp. Molmenti was
a staunch nationalist and the Risorgimento of 1860’s Italy influenced his substantial
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work. He argued for Venetian Republican exceptionalism. Like Rawdon Brown,
Molmenti perceived Venice as an organism. He divided its history into “Le orgini,” the
genesis of the city, “Le splendore,” Venice’s era of imperial dominion, and “Le
decadimento,” the era of decadent decline. Molmenti’s periodization of Venice can still
be seen in how modern Venetian historians organize Venetian history. Molmenti’s work
veered away from the traditional political narrative of Venice and focused on Venetian
cultural and social themes. 25
Many of the early nineteenth century Venetian histories that upheld the myth of
Venice were nationalistic tracts. Bruno Dudan, in his Il dominio veneziano di levante,
incorporated Venice’s former imperial possessions in Illyria as a justification for a
modern Italian colony in Dalmatia. 26 The interwar narratives largely ignored the role of
Venice’s natural environment and instead glorified Venetian political and legal
domination of mainland polities. Many Italian historians “prostituted their pens to the
cause of ultranationalistic history.” 27 Roberto Cessi was one of the few Italian historians
who did not allow ultranationalism to influence his interpretation of Venice. Cessi cast a
more critical eye upon the Venetian Republic and viewed Venetian expansion on the
mainland as a distraction from the city’s lucrative eastern possessions. 28
Subsequent historians in the twentieth century interpreted the myth of Venice in a
unique manner. During Mussolini’s rule over Italy, fascist party members honored the
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Venetians for their commitment to the state and their unwavering legal code. 29 During the
Cold War, some American historians viewed Venice as analogous to the United States.
F.C. Lane highlighted Venice’s similarities to the American Republic in his presidential
address to the American Historical Society in 1965. 30 Brian Pullan’s work in Crisis and
Change in the Venetian Economy viewed the Venetian patriciate as the binding element
in the Republic and upheld the myth’s ideal of Venice as guardian of political
freedoms. 31
Lane’s encomium of Venice’s Republican virtues greatly differed from the antimyth historians. These scholars challenged the myth of Venice after the dismemberment
of the Venetian Republic in the late eighteenth century at the hands of Napoléon
Bonaparte. Authors critically questioned Venice’s expansion into Terraferma. Pierre
Daru’s early nineteenth century work, L’Historie des Républiques de Venise, questioned
the central myths of the Venetian Republic. Daru critiqued Venetian Republican
exceptionalism and the myth of the “good republic.” Both Daru and Ugo Foscolo’s Storia
di Venezia viewed Venice not as the protector of mainland polities, but as an aggressor
that manipulated mainland communities. 32 Both authors questioned Venetian virtues
likely as an extension of their defense of the French dismantlement of the Venetian
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Republic in 1797. Gaetano Cozzi questioned the principle of equality within the Venetian
ruling class and asserted that Venice was more of an oligarchy than a Republic. 33
The rejection of the myth of Venice is most clearly seen in how historians shifted
their focus from Venice’s maritime empire to Terraferma. In the mythical representation
of the Republic, Venice was purely a maritime republic. 34 The virtues of the Venetian
Republic came from its isolation from the mainland and its connection to the sea. The
Venetians bolstered their imagery as a maritime republic with state ceremonies, such as
Ascension Day. Every May 29, the Doge ventured out into the Adriatic and cast a golden
ring into the water to symbolize Venice’s marriage to the sea. Although Ascension Day
held specific Christian significance on the Italian mainland, for the Venetians the holiday
was an illustration of maritime and political dominance of the Adriatic.
Viewing Terraferma timber policy as an important facet of the Venetian Empire
places this thesis directly into the anti-myth camp. That is, this thesis challenges the
traditional view (myth) of Venice as a benevolent maritime republic in several ways.
Venice was not strictly a maritime empire and possessed an important land-based western
empire. Likewise, asserting that the Venetians passed forest legislation at the expense of
mainland communities critiques Venice’s claim as protector of Terraferma liberties. This
thesis questions the myth of Venice by placing greater significance on the Republic’s
mainland empire and contributes to the historiography of Venetian Terraferma by
inserting law into the mainland narrative.
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Terraferma
Several pertinent themes dominate the historical narratives of Venetian expansion
onto the Italian mainland and the establishment of Terraferma. This thesis inserts itself
into three ongoing debates on Terraferma. The first theme questions the centrality of
Venice’s maritime empire. As briefly mentioned above, after the decline of Venetian
State histories, historians began to acknowledge the importance of the mainland within
Venetian history and governmental institutions. The Italian mainland is an important
facet in Venetian history because mainland timber sustained Venice’s Eastern maritime
Empire and played a role in shaping the history of the Po River Valley.
Writing in the middle of the twentieth century, Roberto Cessi focused on Venice’s
maritime empire. In his Storia di Venezia, Cessi portrayed the Venetians as a maritime
people, similar to Genoa or Pisa, but unique in its Republican system of government. 35 In
Cessi’s appraisal, expansion into Terraferma weakened Venice’s hold on eastern
maritime possessions. Expenditures on continued mainland wars diverted funds necessary
to stem the ascendancy of the Ottomans. 36 Cessi’s history followed the myth of Venice
by placing more importance on Venetian maritime possessions.
More recent historians bolstered the myth of Venice and continued to place an
emphasis on Venice’s maritime exploits. Jan Morris proposed a certain inevitability of
Venetian maritime prominence by stating that “Venice was clearly destined to be
something special among the nations.” 37 Morris labeled Venice as the commercial and
maritime hub of the Mediterranean Sea. John Julius Norwich echoed Morris’s focus upon
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the sea by beginning his study of Venice with Alcuin’s question “Quid est Mare?-What is
the Sea?” Alcuin’s answer, “Refugium in periculis-A shelter amidst danger,” summarizes
Norwich’s appraisal of Venice’s connection to the sea. 38 Venetian maritime success
makes it tempting to view the Republic as strictly a naval empire, but such a perception
neglects Venice’s mainland empire. By using forest law as an avenue into Terraferma,
this thesis seeks to add the mainland perspective to the narrative of the Venetian
Republic.
The trend of focusing on Terraferma began with late nineteenth century.
Molmenti situated the Venetian expansion into Terraferma in the early fifteenth century
as the beginning of the downfall of the republic. He stated that Venetian expansion into
Terraferma “exhausted the accumulated wealth which should have gone to aid her sea
power.” 39 Molmenti may not have considered how timber, a land-based resource,
influenced Venice’s maritime fortunes. In order to sustain its maritime power, Venice
was required to build and administer a land-based empire in Terraferma. Molmenti
simply did not incorporate how timber supplies may have influenced the Venetian
perception of the strategic importance of their mainland territories.
F. C. Lane began to bridge the gap between Venice’s maritime focus and the
narrative of the mainland in his Venetian Ships and Shipbuilders of the Renaissance.
Lane connected Terraferma timber to the security of Venice’s maritime empire. He stated
“Venice was dependent upon access to terrestrial products from which the ships were
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made.” 40 Lane largely focused on Venice’s naval prowess, but by noting the connection
between timber and naval security he started to connect the “Venetian Myth” and “Antimyth” interpretations of Venice’s role as a maritime Republic. This inquiry complements
Lane’s work as it adds the development of forest law into the discussion of Venetian
timber resources.
The second theme attempts to parse why the Venetians expanded onto the
mainland and how the expansion changed the Venetian government. Two approaches
developed within the historiography. The first approach views Venetian expansion as an
unplanned set of opportunistic annexations. M. E. Mallett summarized this approach by
stating that Venetian Terraferma annexations were haphazard and uncoordinated. 41 The
second approach sees Venetian annexation as a coordinated expansion of Venetian
commercial ties to the mainland. D. S. Chambers best articulated this second position. He
stated, “Venetians in the Italian mainland expressed no sudden ambition to gain territory,
revenues and jurisdiction, but were more concerned with the security of traditional lines
of commerce.” 42 Timber was one of the first commodities Venice extracted from the
mainland and the mainland timber trade bolstered the connections between Venice and
mainland communities. The Venetians adapted their methods of annexation to the city
being incorporated into Terraferma. This second approach fits well within the
development of Venetian forest law because the forest laws developed to initially
regulate commerce then evolved to dominate usufructory rights.
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The third theme examines Venice’s claim as protector of the mainland. The “antimyth” historians, who question the myth of Venice, accuse the Venetians of reducing the
rights of Terraferma communities and excluding them from the Republic’s government.
This vein of Terraferma historiography often argued that Venice inconsistently governed
mainland polities. 43 The historians who attempt to uphold specific parts of the myth of
Venice, acknowledge that Venice subjugated some polities but claim that such measures
were atypical. Scholars of this vein could, but do not, cite Venice’s ruthlessness in
deposing of the Paduan Carraresi family as one of the few cases of Venetian subjugation.
S. J. Woolf examined Venetian institutional control of small polities in
Terraferma. Woolf argues that a division between Venice and the provinces widened
during the middle of the fifteenth century. 44 Venice’s relationship with mainland polities
kept the early Venetian forest legislation less intrusive. The 1476 laws granted the
Arsenale an extensive amount of power over Terraferma polities and possibly
contributed to the division between Venice and mainland communities. Venice was
utterly dependent on mainland communities for its charcoal, wooden pilings, and shiptimber. The relationship between Venice and its mainland possessions was always
tenuous.
Nicolai Rubinstein argued that Venice’s expansion into Terraferma led Florence
and the Papal States to believe that Venice was positioning itself to establish an Italian
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Empire. 45 Notable humanists, such as Machiavelli and Guicciardini, echoed this
appraisal. Rubinstein’s assessment of Venetian-Italian relationships pinpoints one of the
major reasons why the Italian polities targeted Venice. Machiavelli’s claim that Venice
was seeking the “monarchy of Italy” was unwarranted. 46 One of the driving forces for the
expansion into Terraferma was Venice’s need for the timber resources of the region and
not simply imperialism. I will contribute to Rubinstein’s work by inserting the Venetian
need for timber into the continuing historical dialogue on the Venetian expansion.
The timber supplies of Terraferma provided an incentive for Venetian expansion
into the region during the fourteenth century. However, it would be foolish to assume
that timber was the only reason for Venetian claims to the Northern Italian mainland. The
acute need for ship-timber was possibly combined with a desire to maintain a buffer zone
between Venice and several of its bitter rivals. As M. E. Mallet and J. R. Hale suggested,
the War of the League of Cambrai revealed Venetian vulnerabilities and prompted the
city of St. Mark to maintain a buffer zone between Florence, France, the Papal States, and
the shores of its lagoon. 47 Yet, earlier wars with Genoa and Hungaria demonstrated a
need for Venice to maintain a defensible frontier. The necessity of a buffer zone did not
detract from Venice’s exploitation of Terraferma’s timber resources. Most likely the
Venetians used Terraferma in a multi-use capacity. The land served as a string of
defenses whilst supplying the Venetian Arsenale with ship-timber.
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Venetian forest law inserts itself quite well into the debate over Venice’s role as
protector of the mainland. Venice granted annexed cities a wide range of freedoms,
including the right to maintain the polity’s legal tradition. However, the development of
Venetian forest law illustrates a gradual change in Venice’s passive management of the
legal traditions of Terraferma. Therefore, this thesis contributes to this branch of
Terraferma historiography by bringing the forest law into the debate. Venetian
Terraferma forest law illustrates Venice’s evolving management of the mainland in the
late fourteenth century and administration of Terraferma throughout the fifteenth century.
Venetian mainland forest law lends itself into the three historiographical branches
of Terraferma history. The annexation of mainland polities in the late fourteenth and
early fifteenth centuries demonstrates that Venice was not only a maritime but also a
land-based empire. Like the hydrological connection between the Po River Valley and
the Adriatic, Venice’s maritime and terrestrial empires depended upon one another and
should not be excluded from each other within the Venetian narrative. The steady
development of forest law from simple market control measures upholds Chambers’s
interpretation of a coordinated Venetian annexation of the mainland. The execution of the
Carraresi family in 1406 signified Venice’s commitment to the Italian mainland.
Venetian forest law also belongs in the discussion of the Republic’s claim to the title of
Terraferma’s protector. Although the forest laws dispossessed mainland communities
from some of their forests, the laws also promulgated positive conservation reforms to
mainland harvest practices.
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Law: Roman vs. Byzantine Legal Foundations of Venetian Law
Adding the narrative of forest law to previous discussions of Venetian legal
systems contributes to the historiography in four ways. First, Hazlitt, Kretschmayr, and
Hodgson mistakenly placed Venice’s legal heritage solely with mainland Roman
institutions. Venetian forest law possessed both Byzantine and Roman legal elements.
Second, it is also inappropriate to discard any Roman influence in Venetian law. The
Venetians implemented Roman legal concepts such as res publica, ager publici, and
civitas to formulate the legal precedence for new restrictions on forest use. 48 Third, a
study of Venetian forest law complements previous examinations of Venice’s legal
control of natural resources. Venice’s legal domination of Adriatic wheat markets
displayed the Republic’s willingness to use law to control natural resources. Lastly, the
development of Venetian forest law demonstrates that the Venetians structured their laws
within the mainland’s legal traditions.
The historiography of Venetian law fits within the larger discussion of the myth
of Venice. Although Venetian historians often included a discussion on law within their
broader surveys of Venetian history, none specifically focuses on the overall
development of Venetian law. One of the earliest authors to comment on Venetian law
was William Carew Hazlitt. Writing in the nineteenth century, Hazlitt connected the
“remarkable institutions” of Venetian law to the city’s Republican nature. 49 By doing so,
Hazlitt did not critique the myth of Venice.
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F. C. Hodgson and Kretschmayr also coupled the Venetian legal system into the
myth of Venetian Republican virtue. 50 Hodgson tied Venetian law into the Roman legal
tradition. 51 Such an assertion falls into the ongoing debate around the origins of Venetian
law. Most scholars conclude that Venetian law was the product of Roman, Byzantine, and
various mainland legal traditions, but disagree on which legal heritage influenced the city
the most. 52 Attaching Venice to the Roman legal tradition upholds an aspect of the myth
of Venice that viewed the Republic as a successor to the Roman Republic/Empire.
William Bouwsma asserted that part of Venice’s legal uniqueness stemmed from
its rejection of medieval imperial law. 53 The incorporation of mainland Italian
communities into the Holy Roman Empire bolstered their Roman legal tradition. In
roughly the same time period (eighth to tenth centuries C.E.), Constantinople dominated
Venetian cultural and political systems. As a result, Venetian law incorporated the
flexibility of Byzantine legal systems. Bouwsma asserted that the Venetians never cited
Roman law. 54 Yet, Terraferma forest law is an excellent example of the Venetians
manipulating Roman legal tradition to secure a natural resource and it is therefore most
appropriate to see Venetian law as the product of Byzantine legal traditions and, with
exposure to the mainland, also influenced by Roman legal code.
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William McNeill contributed to the debate surrounding Venetian legal traditions
as well. Although McNeill is best known for his works in world history and
epidemiological history, his contribution to Venetian historiography should not be
overlooked. 55 McNeill examined how the Venetians implemented a system of
commercial laws in order to dominate the Adriatic’s wheat trade. Venetian law required
any exportation of wheat to first pass through Venice before reaching its final
destination. 56 Lane also noted that the Venetians established a regulatory system to fine
merchants who did not first unload their wheat in Venice. 57 Therefore, this thesis
contributes another example of the Venetian implementation of law as a means to control
a natural resource.
McNeill’s work is also noteworthy for this inquiry because he proposed that from
the thirteenth century to the eighteenth century Venice was the cultural hinge of the
Eastern Mediterranean. He stated that Venice and the Venetians were the “principal
mediators and links between the Adriatic, Aegean, and Black Sea regions.” 58 It is
important to remember that Venice was not only one of the cultural conduits of the
Eastern Mediterranean, but it was also the cultural center for its mainland Italian
possessions. Forest law provides a window into how Venetian legal systems served as a
mediator of Terraferma communities.
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Although Roman law served as the foundation for mainland Italian legal
traditions, legal diversity typified Terraferma community statutes (contadi). Gaetano
Cozzi suggested that a “legal diaphragm” existed between Venice and Terraferma
communities. Mainland legal traditions were technical, rigid, and not predisposed to
adapting to empirical review, whereas Venetian law adapted to fit the legal diversity of
the mainland and was flexible enough to incorporate regulatory systems for mainland
commerce including timber. Cozzi’s “diaphragm” could be more accurately labeled as a
tension between Terraferma and Venetian laws. The structure of early fifteenth century
Venetian forest law indicates that Venice was aware of this tension and molded their
legal claims to mainland timber to fit within the mainland’s legal traditions. 59
Venice used the legal traditions of the mainland in order to dominate the key
natural resource for the production of ships. The Venetians exploited the forest resources
of the mainland. Venetian mainland forest law developed from the Republic’s Byzantine
legal heritage, but incorporated Roman legal elements when the Venetians manipulated
mainland contadi. Venetian forest law illustrated the Republic’s adaptability to
Terraferma legal traditions and provides a new perspective on the Venetian expansion on
the mainland.
Forests: Grafting Timber into the Venetian Narrative
Forest histories are a recent development, and very few forest law histories exist.
More recently the historical scholarship on forests has thrived. Forest history is, as
Russell Meiggs once mused, “a field which is too important to be ignored and in which
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much new ground can be won.” By contributing my Venetian forest narrative to the well
established histories of Venice I hope that I can conquer a small portion of this untaken
ground.
In the inter-war period, French and American historians began to examine how
the environment of Northeastern Italy influenced the Venetian historical narrative. One of
the originators of the Annales school, Lucien Febvre, began the modern tradition of
Venetian forest histories. Febvre believed that the forests of the Mediterranean rapidly
declined in the classical era. 60 He asserted that the oak forests of the Po River Valley,
which supported the Venetian Empire, were numerous before the Roman era.
According to Febvre, the aptitude for a culture to take up the “maritime spirit”
depended largely on their natural environment. Timber was a natural mainland product
that sustained the Venetian “maritime spirit.” Such a suggestion can be very easily
labeled as deterministic. However, Febvre’s approach to Venetian maritime prowess is a
not a form of environmental determinism because he asserted that the Venetian expansion
along the Dalmatian coast was not geographically inevitable. 61 Febvre cited the lagoonhamlet of Poitevin Marais, in France’s Aunis province, as an example of another, less
successful marshland community. Febvre credited the discovery of new trading routes by
the Portuguese as the dominant cause of the decline in Venetian fortunes in the sixteenth
century. 62 This argument fits well within Febvre’s larger assertion on the importance of
maritime trade routes. The discovery of new spice trade routes by the Portuguese
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certainly influenced the decline of Venice, but it was not the sole cause of Venetian
decline. In fact, Venetian trade spiked for several decades after De Gama’s voyage in
1498. 63 The scarcity of Terraferma timber resources must be accounted for in a
discussion of Venetian decline.
In addition to Febvre, some of the first scholars who examined the role of the
forests in the Venetian narrative were geographers. Ellen Semple articulated the role of
the environment on the historical narrative in her 1911 book, Influences of Geographic
Environment. She asserted that “all historical development takes place on the earth's
surface, and therefore is more or less molded by its geographic setting.” 64 Semple echoed
the assertion of Immanuel Kant that "Geography lies at the basis of history." 65 Semple’s
German education, under Friedrich Ratzel, informed her discussion of Mediterranean
forests.
F. C. Lane produced the definitive Venetian forest history in 1934. His book,
Venetian Ships and Shipbuilders of the Renaissance is part of this larger trend of nonItalian Venetian historians. Lane devoted an entire chapter in his book to the timber
supplies of the Venetian Arsenale. Through his examinations of Marino Sanuto’s journals
(Diarii), Lane concludes that oak, larch, and fir were the primary species used by the
Venetian Arsenal. 66 Oak served as the core of Venetian ships. According to Lane, the
Venetian sources of oak were located near the Piave River, well within Venice’s
mainland possessions. Lane stated that early Venice held access to plentiful supplies of
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timber and exported timber resources from at least the tenth century. 67 Lane, like Ellen
Semple did for the classical world, argued that suitable specimens of oak rapidly depleted
with Venetian use. 68 Lane charted the development of Venetian forest law beyond the
temporal parameters of this inquiry. This thesis serves as an expansion of Lane’s brief
overview of Venetian forest law within the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, and asserts
that forest law is a neglected facet of Venice’s conquest of the mainland.
J. Donald Hughes, J. V. Thirgood, and Russell Mieggs all focused on the
Classical era, yet provided some insight into the timber supplies of Venice. Hughes
argued that Greek and Roman shipbuilding resulted in the deforestation of sections of the
Mediterranean. For the Romans, the loss of forests was “the most widespread and most
noticeable change made in the natural environment.” 69 The scarcity of classical sources
makes it difficult to be as definitive as Hughes. It is uncertain, yet highly unlikely, that
Roman timber harvests modified future Venetian state forests. The Romans harvested
much of their ship-timber from Sicily. 70 Mainland Italian stands of Arsenal-grade oak
declined with continued Venetian use, however Hughes’s approach leaves little room for
the eventual recovery of forests.
Brian Pullan understated Venice’s access to mainland timber in his A History of
Renaissance Venice. He argued that Venice and Genoa lacked the natural resources that
were readily available for the Pisani. According to Pullan, Venice’s only natural
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resources were “salt and fish.” This lack of resources forced the Venetians to
“concentrate on maritime trade and expansion seawards.” 71 Venice could not have
dominated the waters of the Adriatic without first dominating its hinterland. In order to
maintain maritime might, ancient and Renaissance powers were forced to control a landbased commodity (timber) through trade or political domination. This thesis asserts that
Venice extended its control into Terraferma in part for its timber resources.
In Venice: A Maritime Republic, F. C. Lane reiterated his arguments on the
decline of Venetian oaks by stating, “The oaks grown in the Venetian Dominions did not
suffice for the demands of the Arsenal and those of private shipbuilders.” 72 Lane’s
interpretation of the sources holds merit, but can be strengthened by addressing the policy
measures the Venetian Republic implemented to stymie the oak shortage. Venetian forest
conservation measures were partially the result of timber’s role in the defense of
Venetian trade and Venice itself.
John Perlin directly examined Venetian timber conservation policies in his survey
of forest history. Perlin grants his reader a brief overview of Venetian timber
conservation measures and discusses Venice’s relationship with mainland polities. Perlin
correctly asserted that Venice pressured Verona into enacting several ship-timber
conservation measures. 73 Verona complied on paper, but like many other mainland
polities, could not change local forest use in order to conserve the Arsenal’s prime oaks.
This lack of Venetian institutional control was a contributing factor to the decline of
prime timber stands.
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Elisabeth Crouzet-Pavan situated Venetian history within its natural setting of the
lagoons. The domination of water resources makes up the bulk of her argument for
Venice acting upon its natural surroundings. 74 Security from natural and man-made
dangers required Venice to control and dominate the waters of the lagoons, the Adriatic,
and eventually the Eastern Mediterranean. Crouzet-Pavan cemented Venice’s intimate
relationship with water to the city’s unique approach to naval warfare. She argued that
prior Venetian histories have portrayed the Venetians as wary and timid in the face of
opposition. 75 The quadriga echoes the countless spoils won by Venice. These military
victories, especially naval, were the foundation of the Venetian Empire. The Venetian
fleet “was, and remained, its primary basis of its power.” 76 Steady timber supplies were
essential to maintaining Venice’s naval basis of power.
Crouzet-Pavan briefly examined the timber supplies of the Venetian navy. She
asserted that much of the oak supply came from Terraferma. 77 As the oaks of the
mainland became denuded with continual use in the fifteenth century, the Venetians
incorporated several stands of oak from Istria. Like Lane, she asserted that the timber
supplies of Terraferma became depleted, and thus the very “foundation of Venetian
power was threatened.” 78 Her assertions align themselves closely with the proposals for
this thesis. However, she only briefly discussed Venice’s relationship to Terraferma
through timber. Much more can be learned about Venice’s relationship with its mainland
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polities through the Venetian need for timber. The Arsenal’s constant need for shiptimber shaped the manner in which Venetian administrators perceived the forest
resources of the Veneto. Crouzet-Pavan’s work is an excellent start in formulating a
Venetian environmental narrative, but the importance of Terraferma timber needs to be
addressed at further length.
Karl Appuhn recently produced the first exclusively Venetian forest history in
2009. Appuhn’s book, A Forest on the Sea: Environmental Expertise in Renaissance
Venice, is an extension of his doctoral dissertation. Appuhn concluded that the Venetians
established some of the first forest conservation laws. The Venetians established “a set of
effective rational tools for enforcing the law and controlling the resource.” 79 Venetian
forestry was a remarkable development, Appuhn suggested, but did not succeed in
conserving essential ship-timber specimens. New Venetian forest laws struggled to
reshape centuries of forest use practice and perceptions. The forest conservation laws
were ultimately unsuccessful because Venice could not regulate the small polities of
Terraferma. Appuhn explored this notion through market regulations and cultural
perceptions. Placing timber as one of the driving forces for Venetian expansion into
Terraferma not only adds to Appuhn’s work but also provides insight into how and why
Venice formulated these forest conservation laws.
Appuhn’s book explored the development of Venice’s professional foresters
(Provveditori sopra boschi). Venetian forestry evolved out of a “perceived” shortage of
Arsenal-grade oak by Venetian legislators. 80 He argued that Venice’s mainland oak
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supplies were not really declining, but a combination of mainland work shortages, the
harvesting cycle, and local forest use practices produced the symptoms of a timber
shortage to Venetian policymakers. 81 Perceived shortage or real, the alarm felt by Venice
opened a policy window for the implementation of forest conservation policies. Appuhn
expertly examined the development of Venetian forest laws and reserves through his
bureaucratic and political history. However, Arsenal timber was a war materiel and
Venetians treated it as such. Thus, it is imperative that scholars attempt to understand
how timber as a war resource shaped the Venetian perception of Terraferma’s
environment.
Venice’s treatment of the environment was decidedly different than its Northern
European contemporaries. The shortage of oak inspired the Venetians to implement a
scientific conservation program first and seek foreign supplies only under desperation.
Yet, several prominent environmental historians claimed that Early Modern Europe’s
scientific worldview supported a culture of environmental manipulation and dominance
throughout the continent. 82 As Appuhn suggested, Merchant and Crosby “assume that
there was a monolithic European view of the relationship between humans and the
natural world.” 83 Renaissance perceptions of the environment were as diverse as the
polities of the Holy Roman Empire. The Venetians and Genoese both relied on mainland
timber and were maritime republics, yet reacted differently to similar environmental
constraints.
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This thesis provides an example of a culture that noticed deforestation and
attempted to implement positive conservation policies. The end result was a system of
forest policies that were far more advanced than any other natural resource policy system
in sixteenth century Europe. The sudden rise of the Ottoman Navy in the fifteenth century
suggests that decline of forests were not as widespread in the Mediterranean as Hughes
asserted. Instead of seeing a widespread collapse of Mediterranean forests, it is best to see
the denudation of Venetian timber as an environmental issue within its cultural and
political context. In order to control the Adriatic and Eastern Mediterranean, the
Venetians were forced to exploit the timber resources of the Po River Valley. The direct
modification of timber distribution by the Venetians was focused on one specific region,
rather than the entire Eastern Mediterranean. 84
An inquiry into the relationship between timber and Venetian law will grant a
more complete understanding of how the Renaissance maritime republics managed their
natural resources. Charting Venetian expansion into Terraferma, examining the origins of
Venetian law, and parsing how Venice manipulated Roman legal traditions may seem
trivial and purely academic, but environmental scholars and the general public can garner
many valuable lessons from the Venetian narrative. A new Venetian timber history may
provide an example of applicable history that not only informs the reader, but provides
lessons on forest management and law.
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CHAPTER II: BRIDLING SAN MARCO’S HORSES: EARLY TIMBER
LEGISLATION AND THE EXPANSION INTO TERRAFERMA

Milan, the Carraresi family of Padua, Hungaria, and the Genoese all challenged
Venice’s role as the central power of Northeastern Italy. Venice’s commercial rivalry
with Genoa dominated the narrative of the fourteenth century and illustrated a need for
Venice to expand onto the mainland in order to supply the Arsenale with more secure
supplies of timber. The Venetians experienced a series of defeats in the late fourteenth
century, which inspired the city to strengthen its defenses through expansion and forest
conservation policies. The pressures placed upon Venice by Padua and the Hungarians
instigated a departure from Venice’s usual passive management of mainland cities.
Active Venetian management of mainland polities preceded the direct domination of
forest resources and began with the execution of the Carraresi family.
The annexation of Terraferma extended from Venetian commercial ties to the
mainland. Vital trade routes, agricultural products, and timber supplies linked Venice to
the mainland since its foundation. The first historical record of Venice comes from the
early sixth century. Cassiodorus, a Roman under the service of Theodoric, labeled the
Venetians as harvesters of salt and fish-eaters. 85 The salt and fish trade on the Italian
mainland was the basis of the earliest Venetian commerce. The protection of Venice’s
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early monopoly on the salt trade inspired one of the earliest Venetian military
interventions on the mainland. In 822, and again in 933, the Venetians sacked their
greatest competitor in the salt market, Commacchio. The seizure of Commacchio
illustrated Venice’s willingness to implement military force to control natural resources
from a very early era.
Timber not only factored directly into the manufacture and transportation of early
Venetian salt supplies, but the Republic also traded timber as a commodity alongside salt
and fish. 86 The expansion of Venice in the eleventh and twelfth centuries required the
acquisition of timber supplies for the transportation of commercial goods and the physical
foundation of the city. Oak pilings, known as tolpi in the Venetian sources, supported the
foundation of the city. The most readily available supplies of tolpi were the mainland oak
forests adjacent to Venice. 87 The harvesting of tens of millions of tolpi strengthened
Venice’s connection to the mainland. 88
The Venetians were still under the sphere of the Byzantine Empire in the eleventh
and twelfth centuries, even after the Pax Nicephori (Peace of Nicephorus) granted Venice
political independence. Venice’s political and cultural ties to Constantinople were
reflected in the Venetian admiration for Byzantine architecture and political systems.
Byzantine law found its way into Venetian legal practices as well. The VenetianByzantine connection can also be seen in Venice’s focus on maritime ventures in the east.
The Venetian commercial connections to the Italian mainland were strong, yet Venice
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specialized in monopolizing the trade of luxury goods out of the Aegean and Black Seas.
Competition over the latter placed Venice in direct conflict with Genoa.
At the instigation of Doge Enrico Dandolo, the Venetians and the Frankish
crusaders permanently diminished the viability of the Byzantine Empire with the sacking
of Constantinople in 1204. Venice and Genoa benefitted directly from the sudden power
vacuum in the Aegean and Black Sea. Venice gained control over three-eighths of the
Byzantine Empire. 89 In the wake of the dismemberment of the Byzantine Empire, the
Venetians acquired key shipping depots on the Dalmatian coast, Negroponte, and Crete.
The Venetians also gained a large swath of Constantinople, centered on the city’s docks
and shipbuilding infrastructure. Venice based its newly-found prominence in the Eastern
Mediterranean upon maritime prowess, especially ship-building. 90 However important a
role eastern trade served for Venetian commerce, Venetian trade was still very much
dependent upon mainland timber. The timber for Venice’s early thirteenth century
expeditions likely came from nearby Mestre. 91
The decline of Byzantine power granted the Genoese unfettered access to the
Black Sea trade routes. Crimean wheat supported the burgeoning population of Genoa,
Venice, and their trading partners. The rivalry between Venice and Genoa over Black Sea
trade caused several wars between the two republics. A deadly brawl between the
Venetians and Genoese over the monastery of Saint Sabas in Acre ignited the War of
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Saint Sabas in 1256. 92 The Venetians displayed their unmatched talent for diplomacy by
gaining the aid of the dominant maritime republic of the eleventh century, Pisa.
The commercial rivalry between the Venetians and Genoese served as the
background to Venice’s early involvement in the politics of the Italian mainland. The
direct annexation of mainland polities was not the objective of Venice’s first intervention
on the mainland, however; Venetian mainland policies sought to maintain favorable
commercial ties with the markets of the Po Valley and the German markets beyond the
Carnic Alps. The Venetians intervened against inland dukes or polities that hindered the
passage of goods, including timber, out of and into Venice. An example of direct
Venetian intervention on the mainland occurred in 1256 when the Venetians dispatched
Marco Badoer to remove Ezzelino III de la Romano from power in Padua. 93 Venice
implemented indirect diplomatic connections to mold the political climate of the Po River
Valley.
Venice crippled rival polities on the mainland with the city’s diplomatic
connections. The Veronese della Scalla family disrupted Venetian mainland commerce
by imposing tolls on Venetian trade. Venice targeted Verona through an alliance with
Florence in 1336. The Veronese placed themselves in an extremely strong position with
the conquest of Padua and Treviso. However, the della Scalla family failed to defend
their state from the combined forces of Venice, Florence, and the Milanese Visconti
family. The Venetians, Florentines, and Milanese all benefitted from removing an
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ascending state in the Po River Valley. The alliance allowed Venice to acquire Treviso in
1339.
The direct annexation of Treviso was Venice’s first permanent mainland
acquisition and signified the first abandonment of the Republic’s passive management of
the mainland. Venice primarily managed mainland states through diplomacy. Venice’s
treatment of Padua in the 1230s serves as an example of typical Venetian mainland
diplomacy. The Trevisans signed a capitulum, a legal statement incorporating Treviso
into the Venetian Commune. The transfer of Venetian political institutions to Treviso
formalized Venice’s first commitment to Terraferma. Venice installed a podestá, an
appointed official with mayoral powers, to govern Treviso and established a large council
akin to the Venetian Council of Ten. 94 The Venetians allowed the Trevisans to keep their
legal customs and provided the city with the freedom to elect lower officials. The
motivations for the Venetian annexation of Treviso were primarily economic. 95
Dominating Treviso afforded Venice control over the exchange of goods on the Sile
River and allowed the Venetians to control the timber resources of the Sile and Lower
Piave. 96
The Venetians waged war against the Genoese over eastern trade in 1350. Control
of Crimean commerce was still at the heart of conflict between the cities of St. Mark and
St. George. The Crimean ports of Kaffa and Soldaia provided the rival maritime powers
with marketable luxury goods such as Baktrian Silk, Far Eastern spices, and Russian furs.
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Yet, neither republic was in the position for a prolonged engagement over the Black Sea
in the 1350s. An epidemic of bubonic plague, which likely originated from the Crimean
ports, struck Venice in 1348. The plague claimed sixty percent of the Venetian
population by 1350 and left the Venetians reeling. 97
In 1350, the Genoese seized several Venetian vessels near Kaffa. The Venetians
attacked Genoese trade in retaliation and the hostilities of the third Venetian-Genoese
War commenced. Both sides attacked commercial ships and ports. The disruption of
commerce was often a major aim for warfare between the two republics and for
fourteenth century warfare in general. 98
Fighting over the strategic Galata Tower, the Genoese inflicted massive
causalities on the combined Venetian/Aragonese fleet during an engagement in the
Bosphorus in 1352. The Venetians lost well over 1600 men. 99 The loss of so many ablebodied mariners was catastrophic for the Venetians after the Black Death. The Genoese
also lost a good portion of their fleet, but still held Galata Tower. After defeating the
Venetians in the Bosphorus, the Genoese exacted trading rights from the Byzantine
Emperor John VI Cantacuzenus that granted the Genoese a monopoly on the Black Sea
trade. The Venetians partially relied on the Black Sea for wheat and could not allow the
Genoese to possess unfettered control of the region.
Wars with Genoa stifled Venetian commerce with the Italian mainland. Venice’s
mainland markets stalled whilst the Arsenale placed pressure on the timber resources near
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Treviso. Under normal circumstances, Venetian galleys lasted nearly a decade, yet the
Venetians lost a good portion of their eastern fleet in the Bosphorus. 100 Venice prioritized
securing stands of timber on the mainland. To make matters worse, the Venetians
experienced a timber shortage in the 1340s. 101 The exportation of timber and usage by the
Arsenale contributed to the shortage of Sessile Oak in that decade. 102 The Arsenale’s
acute need for timber required the Venetians to regulate the mainland’s timber market.
The Venetians did not yet possess the authority to regulate mainland forests. Thus, in
order to secure timber supplies for the Arsenale, the Venetians were required to control
the importation of ship-timber into the city.
Only the Great Council (Maggior Consiglio) possessed the authority to regulate
incoming commerce into the city. This body of fifteen-hundred men formed the core of
the legislative branch of the Venetian government and were the patricians of the city. All
major policy decisions ultimately rested on the Great Council. The Senate (Pregadi)
controlled day-to-day legislation and consisted of one hundred and twenty men with
numerous ex officio members. 103 The Doge oversaw the entire legislative body with his
six councilors, the Minor Council (Minor Signoria). However, the councilors did not play
a minor role because the Doge was essentially powerless without their approval. The
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Great Council, the Senate, the Doge, and his councilors formed the basis of the Venetian
government, known as the Commune Veneciarum in the primary sources. The Commune
encapsulated the government’s authority to administer the Sestieri, the six cities of
Venice. As the Venetians expanded onto the mainland the language of rule changed.

Figure 2.1:

Commune Veneciarum c. 1350.

Another important Venetian political body that formulated forest policy was the
Council of Ten. The Great Council established the Council of Ten in July of 1310 as an
emergency measure against the Tiepolo family. 104 Bajamonte Tiepolo attempted to
overthrow the Great Council in June of 1310. 105 The Great Council permanently
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established the Council of Ten in 1334. The Council of Ten consisted of the ten
councilors, the six ministers (Savii Grandi), and the Doge. In the fifteenth century, the
Council of Ten administered the security of Terraferma and eventually enacted several
important pieces of forest legislation. Timber was a crucial component for Venetian
security and the Council of Ten’s authority to manage mainland forests was an extension
of their primary responsibility to maintain the security of the Republic.
The Great Council addressed the timber shortage of the 1340s through the passage
of a law that regulated the oak trade within Venice. Enacted in 1350, the law granted the
Arsenale its choice of the finest specimens of oak in the Venetian market. 106 This
measure was an indirect attempt on the part of the Great Council to control the quality of
timber produced on the mainland. No legal precedence existed for Venice to dictate forest
management policy to Treviso in 1350. The inconvenient timing of the oak shortage with
the Genoese war inspired an epiphany among the Venetians. The timber resources of the
mainland were finite and could very well disappear without regulation. This sudden
realization spurred the Venetians into developing a policy of conservation and
domination of mainland timber resources. 107 Venetian forest laws of the fourteenth
century serve as the most tangible object of Venice’s policy of forest conservation.
Venice, Milan, and Florence dominated the politics of late fourteenth century
Northeastern Italy. Venice’s role as a major player came from its commercial ties to the
Italian mainland and the city’s vast trading empire in the Adriatic and Aegean Seas.
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Situated in the upper watershed of the Po River, Milan sought to expand south under the
leadership of Gian Galeazzo II Visconti. The Visconti family dominated Milan since the
early fourteenth century and constituted a more traditional lordship (Signoria) than
Venice. 108 Milanese expansion in the south placed them in direct conflict with the
Florentines, who sought to protect their interests in Romagna. Although the Florentines
distrusted the Venetians, they found a common enemy in Milan.
During the second Venetian-Genoese war, Genoa came under the protection of
the Milanese Visconti family. Milan’s proximity to Treviso placed Venice’s only direct
mainland possession in a precarious position during this war. Nevertheless, the Milanese
threat and the timber shortage exposed two vital weaknesses in Venice’s position on the
mainland. One source of timber was not only insufficient for the production of warships
in the Arsenale, but was dangerous as well. The Venetians flirted with disaster by relying
on one vulnerable city for their timber supply. Likewise, the Milanese also revealed to
Venice and its rivals that the Republic lacked a buffer between its lagoons and rival
mainland powers like Milan and Florence.
The Genoese recommenced hostilities with the Venetians in 1354. Paganino
Doria attacked Venetian cities along the Dalmatian coast and disrupted Venetian trade
throughout the Adriatic. Paganino was part of the long line of the Dorias that produced
learned and skilled commanders throughout the history of the republic of St. George.
After his success in the Adriatic, Doria shifted his focus to the Aegean Sea. The
Venetians pursued Doria with fifty-six ships, however Doria ambushed the Venetians and
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captured them near the harbor of Sapienza in November of 1354. The Genoese caught the
Venetians resupplying and attacked them while their vessels were beached. 109
The Venetian defeat at Sapienza placed a heavy burden upon Venetian commerce
and the Arsenale’s timber supplies. The defeat also illustrated that continued war with
Genoa required the Republic to maintain multiple secure sources of timber. Dalmatia and
the Italian mainland were the most likely sources during the second Venetian-Genoese
war. The Arsenale required properly seasoned timber reserves in order to replace the lost
vessels. The Venetians knew the dangers of ships built of green timber. 110 As Vegetius,
the fourth century Roman strategist, noted, “nothing is more dangerous for sailors than
fresh timber.” 111 Green timber was prone to cracking in saltwater and made ships slower.
The timber shortage on the mainland left the Venetians and the Arsenale in no place to
continue hostilities with the Genoese in the winter of 1354-55. In June 1355, the
Venetians brokered a truce with the Milanese through an agreement that barred the
Venetians and Genoese from trade in the Black Sea for three years. 112
In 1356, Hungaria and the Genoese both attacked the Venetians. Venice’s direct
domination of Trevisan politics allowed the Venetian podestá to foil a plot to hand over
the city to the Hungarians. Treviso bogged King Lajos’s forces down and allowed the
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Venetians to negotiate a truce in the late months of 1356. 113 However, Treviso crumbled
in 1357 and the Hungarians controlled the mainland shores of the lagoon. The Venetians
dispatched envoys to the Magyar king to sue for peace. Venetian possessions on the
Dalmatian coast served as the pretext for the Hungarian War and King Lajos sought to
ruin any opportunity for Venice to recover its position in Dalmatia. Thus, he demanded
Venice’s Dalmatian possessions as the cost for peace.
Losing the Dalmatian cities would impede Venice’s access to a ship-timber
conifer that the forests around Treviso lacked. Trade upon the Adriatic united the Latin
Venetians and Slavic Dalmatians more than it separated them. 114 Zara (Zadar), Ragusa
(Dubrovnik), and Fiume (Rijeka) provided the Venetian fleet with crucial stops along the
way to the Aegean and granted Venice trade in precious metals, slaves, and timber.
Norwich suggests that Dalmatian Pine was the “chief source of timber for Venice’s
fleet.” 115 Such an assertion is problematic because Sessile Oak was the primary species
that the Arsenale and private shipwrights consumed. The construction of ships primarily
with species of the Pinus genus was more prevalent in the Ancient Era. 116 The Arsenale
acquired Silver Fir from Dalmatian cities for the production of masts and spars.
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Figure 2.2: Dalmatia. Source: C. I. Gable, Dalmatia Pirates
(http://www.boglewood.com/timeline/pirates.html).
The Hungarian war only magnified Venice’s concern about the security of
Treviso. The Venetians acquiesced to the peace terms with the Hungarian King because
very few alternatives existed for the struggling Republic. The Hungarians firmly
controlled Treviso, the “final bastion, on which the safety of the Republic itself
depended.” 117 The Venetians sacrificed their Dalmatian provinces for the safety of
Treviso. Repeated assaults upon the Venetian mainland required Venice to shift some of
its focus onto securing Treviso and its valuable timber market. Although the Venetians
lost their Dalmatian possessions, the Hungarians afforded them access to Istrian timber.
Venetian presence in Istria dates back well into the ninth century and did not hinder King
Lajos’s aspirations in Dalmatia. 118 Yet, access to Istrian Fir was always problematic due
to a general lack of labor and the peninsula’s precariously close position to Dalmatia. 119
A revolt in Trieste in 1369 hindered Venetian access to Istrian timber by halting timber
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harvests. The loss of Dalmatia made it crucial for Venice to strengthen its commercial
and political ties to the mainland in order to bolster the security of the lagoon and
safeguard valuable mainland commerce, including timber.
The Carraresi family is one of the lesser-known Italian families of the fourteenth
century, yet they played a direct role in instigating Venetian expansion onto the Italian
mainland. The family seized control of Padua from the della Scalla family in the early
fourteenth century. 120 The family looked to capitalize on Venice’s weakened position
after the Hungarian war and agitated anti-Venetian sentiments in Padua. Francesco da
Carrara raised an army and besieged the city in the autumn of 1369. The Venetians
successfully defended the mainland from the Carraresi family until the Hungarians
intervened once again in 1373. The combined forces of the Carraresi and the Hungarians
handed the Venetians two swift defeats. The war turned in Venice’s favor when the
Venetians captured the nephew of the King Lajos near a Venetian fortification on the
Brenta River. Venice forced the Hungarians out of the war and isolated Francesco from
his allies.
The Carraresi attacked Venetian fortifications on the Brenta River in order to
acquire the nearby saltworks, yet the Brenta played a crucial role in Venetian mainland
commerce. The economy of the mainland and the Venetian timber suppliers utilized the
region’s major rivers for the transportation of goods. Treviso’s economic importance and
proximity to the Sile River was no mere coincidence. Each mainland timber river
presented the Venetians with unique challenges, but the Piave watershed supported the
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growth of the four essential ship-timber species: Sessile Oak (Quercus sessiliflora),
European Beech (Fagus sylvatica), Silver Fir (Abies alba), and European Larch (Larix
decidua). The Venetians also harvested Wych Elm (Ulmus glabra) and Persian Walnut
(Juglans regia) for the construction of mastheads and rudders, respectively. 121 However,
both species played a secondary role in ship production.

Figure 2.3: Sessile Oak. Source: Hesse, Germany - Wikimedia Commons
(http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/8/89/Quercus_petraea_06.jpg).

Figure 2.4: European Beech. Source: Wikimedia Commons
(http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/5/5b/Grib_skov.jpg).
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Figure 2.5: Silver Fir. Source: Thüringer Wald, Germany-Wikimedia Commons
(http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/8/8e/Abies_alba_Schleus_Berg_b_Suh
l_ThW_Th_Dreger.jpg).

Figure 2.6: Wych Elm. Source: California State Polytechnical University-SLO
SelecTree (http://selectree.calpoly.edu/photos.lasso?rid=800).

Figure 2.7: European Larch. Source: U.C. Berkeley. CalPhotos
(http://calphotos.berkeley.edu/imgs/512x768/0000_0000/0613/2030.jpeg).
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Figure 2.8: Persian Walnut. Source: Persian Walnut. Oregon State University.
Department of Horticulture (http://oregonstate.edu/dept/ldplants/images/jure6888.jpg).
The Venetians consistently experienced shortages of the two deciduous hardwood
species: oak and beech. Sessile Oak, also referred to as Durmast Oak, was the most
important tree species for the Venetian Arsenale. Oak provided Venetian vessels with a
solid, rot-resistant keel and “accounted for over three-quarters of the timber in a Venetian
ship.” 122 The Arsenale also utilized Oak’s decurrent and branching growth pattern by
fashioning odd angled branches into knees for deck beams and solid ribs. Sessile Oaks
prefer the large swath of alluvial soil near the Venetian Lagoon and the lowlands of the
Po River Valley. The Arsenale harvested beech at intermediate altitudes for the
construction of oars. Beech’s affinity for well-drained soils allowed the species to thrive
only in a limited section of the mainland. 123 Prominent beech stands appear in the lower
montane zone at 1,300 feet. Venetian industries placed pressure on the Arsenale by
consuming the limited beech forests on the mainland for the production of charcoal.
In the 1320s Marino Sanuto the elder remarked to Pope John XXII that the best fir
and larch in the world could be found in Venice. 124 Fir and larch are softwood species
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that prefer higher elevations than both oak and beech. Silver Fir thrives in the cool, moist
air of Dolomites and avoids the relative warmth of the Po River valley. Thus, the
Venetians ventured into the Dolomites to acquire appropriate fir specimens. A mature
tree served as the best material for masts. A Venetian shipwright could hone several
masts out of a 180-foot tall mature Silver Fir. The Arsenale constructed interior molding
and beams from larch. 125 Like fir, larch also thrives in cold conditions and required welldrained montane soils. Although larch played a secondary role to fir and oak, secure
access to the species required the Venetians to extend their control into the tree’s habitat.
Tree species distribution, available labor, and proximity to rivers helped to
determine the location of Venetian timber harvests. Each ship-timber species favored
specific climactic and soil conditions. 126 Conifers’ proclivity for cold and moist environs
forced the Venetians to look for fir at higher elevations in the Alps, whereas oak thrived
in the alluvial lowlands of the Po River Valley. Available manpower was a real concern
for Arsenale tree harvests. 127 Harvests often occurred in February or March to coincide
with higher water flows in rivers and the labor market. Available labor for timber harvest
was contingent upon the mainland agricultural cycle and labor was often available after
the planting of the winter wheat crop. Population density also influenced the amount of
available labor. Luckily for the Arsenale, oak stands thrived along the densely populated
Po River. However, mountain settlements with access to conifers possessed smaller pools

125

Venetian source for species of timber: Senato Mar, reg, 21, ff. 20, 32. Larch is a bit of an oddity in the
tree world because it is a deciduous conifer.
126

Herein there is little need to present the Köppen Classification of the Veneto. This general principle of
soil and climate applies to most forests: Karl F. Wenger, ed., Forestry Handbook (Hoboken, NJ: Wiley and
Sons, 1984), 98.
127

Appuhn, A Forest on the Sea, 46.

55
of labor. Manpower dissipated as harvests moved further north into the Alps or moved
east of the Piave River. Territories farther east, such as Istria, consistently lacked
available labor for harvests.
Deep rivers with consistent spring flow rates allowed the Venetians to transport
timber out of the Po River Valley and the Alps for final production at the Arsenale. The
Venetians planned their harvests to focus on the timber nearest to rivers in order to ease
transportation and reduce cost. Fine timber reserves existed along the Quieto in Istria, yet
the Quieto possessed inconsistent flow rates, which made Istrian timber expensive. 128
Timing the harvest with the snow melt played a crucial role in a successful timber harvest
for the Arsenal. Years with low precipitation posed serious limitations on the
transportation of timber to Venice. The vicissitudes of conditions imposed by the labor
force and the weather made it impractical for Venice to base its entire timber supply on
just Treviso and the Sile River. Control of Terraferma’s rivers would allow the Venetians
to manipulate the exchange of timber on the mainland.
Out of the six important timber watersheds, the Piave produced Venice’s richest
supply of harvestable timber and all the species necessary for ship production. The Piave
is an important river for this inquiry because the Venetians established their first Arsenale
reserves along the Piave at Belluno and Montello. The Piave originates in the Carnic Alps
near the foot of Mount Peralba at an altitude of 8,500 feet. The forests of the Upper Piave
fall within the upper montane Mediterranean zone and are dominated by conifers with
intermittent beech stands. 129 Cadore and Belluno provided Venice with timber supplies
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out of the Upper Piave. The conifer dominated forests of Cadore and Belluno give way to
a mixture of conifers and deciduous trees near Asolo. This middle stretch provided the
Venetians primarily with beech, but also supported stands of oak. The Lower Piave
nourished excellent stands of oaks and settlements near the river possessed abundant
amounts of manpower. 130 The Piave emptied near the Venetian lagoon and was ideal for
it provided a deep flowrate for the transportation of lumber.
The Isonzo and Tagliamento allowed the Venetians to harvest timber from Friuli.
Both rivers originate in the Alps and harbored good stands of oak and beech. The
decrease in population density along the Isonzo made it difficult for successful harvests.
Harvesting along the Tagliamento was also not ideal because of the river’s unpredictable
flowrate. 131 The Venetians floated timber from the Isonzo’s mouth some eighty miles
away from Venice to the Arsenale. Despite the limitations of the Tagliamento and the
Isonzo, the Venetians extracted timber from Venzone and Gorizia.
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Figure 2.9:

Timber Rivers within the Po River Watershed. Adapted from the
Eastern Kentucky University Department of Geography
(http://people.eku.edu/davisb/geo100/Poriver.htm).

The location of rivers and the distribution of ship-timber species also affected
Venetian rivals. Venice’s proximity to the steady gradation of the vegetative zones of the
Po Plain and the Alps afforded the Venetians more timber species to work with than their
rivals. Liguria offered beech and abundant supplies of chestnut to the Genoese. Yet,
Genoese supplies of ship-timber were spread along thin Ligurian coastal shelves. The Po
River watershed granted the Venetians several avenues for timber transportation that
Liguria lacked. It is undeniable that the unique geography of Venice upon the lagoon
afforded St. Mark’s Republic certain advantages that its rivals lacked.
The ongoing Venetian-Genoese rivalry rendered Venice’s foothold on Treviso
and the timber trade of the Piave untenable. A fight over precedence during the
coronation of Peter II of Cyprus instigated yet another war with Genoa in 1378. 132 The
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fight over precedence was simply a proxy for tensions over eastern trade. The fight
started the War of Chioggia. This new war was much different from previous conflicts
between Genoa and Venice. The Genoese used the war to attack Venice’s exposed
mainland territory and the war served as a springboard for Venice’s conquest of
Terraferma and the mainland’s timber resources.
The Venetians also struggled to find steady supplies of beech during the latter half
of the fourteenth century. The 1350 regulation on oak trade within Venice responded to a
shortage of prime oak. The Venetians referred to the oak shortage as a carestia, a famine.
Such language in the primary sources is often paired only with a shortage of wheat or
salt. 133 Wheat and salt were the other two natural resources that Venice managed through
the manipulation of legal codes. The Great Council passed a regulation in 1372 that
imposed a nine grossi fine upon ship captains per lost oar. 134 The grosso was a measure
of silver Venetian coinage equivalent to 4% of the value of a ducat. 135 Commanders
often lost several dozen oars at a time. The fine could increase quite quickly, so many
ship captains avoided the fine by leaving excess oars with the Arsenale. The oar policy
attempted to conserve beech supplies with Venice and did not directly address timber
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consumption on the mainland. Only an extension of Venetian political authority onto the
mainland would allow Venice to govern and direct forest resources.
A Venetian ship could not operate without beech oars. The construction of each
large Venetian galley required 180 oars and consumed, at a conservative estimate, forty
mature beech trees. 136 Thus a small fleet of fourteen galleys required over 2,500 oars and
consumed 560 trees. Such a figure does not consider the additional pressure placed upon
timber resources by Venetian firewood and industrial needs. The scarcity of beech made
oars a valuable commodity for the Arsenale and the general shortage of timber, coupled
with demographic losses to the plague, reduced the size of fleets in the War of Chioggia.
In preparation for another naval fight with Genoa, the Great Council placed Vittor
Pisani and Carlo Zeno in control of the Republic’s naval forces. In May of 1378, Zeno
began a raiding campaign on Genoese vessels in the Aegean and Pisani led a Venetian
fleet of fourteen galleys to attack the Genoese in the Tyrrhenian Sea. 137 Pisani’s
expedition found early success with his defeat of a Genoese fleet south of the mouth of
the Tiber. The Venetians turned their attention to reacquiring cities along the Dalmatian
coast. Pisani captured Cattaro (Kotor) and Sebenico (Šibenik) before retiring at Pola for
the winter of 1378-79. The bitterly cold and damp conditions of the quarters at Pola
weakened the Venetian fleet. The Genoese caught the Venetians in port in May 1379 and
captured most of Pisani’s ships. The Venetians killed the Genoese commander, Luciano
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Doria, but lost complete control of the Adriatic Sea and imprisoned Pisani for neglecting
to patrol Pola’s harbor. 138
Venice emerged from the defeat at Pola in a defenseless position. The Genoese
secured alliances with the Carraresi and the Hungarians. The Genoese navy cruised
through the Adriatic with impunity and the Carraresi shut Venice off from its mainland.
The Genoese, Carraresi, and Hungarians planned to choke Venice into submission.
Venice’s policy of noninterference in the politics of the mainland allowed Genoa to
quickly blockade the city. Genoa took the island of Chioggia in August and prepared to
assault the city directly. Venice sued for peace, but Pietro Doria, the Genoese
commander, replied, “You will never have peace from the lord of Genoa until we bridle
the unreined horses of Saint Mark.” 139 The death of Pietro Doria’s nephew at Pola
doubtlessly still vexed him and the Genoese acted in a manner that suggests that they
intended to indefinitely ruin Venice’s naval and commercial capabilities. 140
The seizure of Chioggia prompted the Venetians to release Pisani from jail. The
Venetian populace believed that the Senate erred by not allowing Pisani’s fleet to winter
in Venice, instead of Pola. 141 Pisani avoided direct conflict and raided Genoese supply
lines in the lagoon while the city anxiously awaited the return of Carlo Zeno from the
east. Zeno wreaked havoc upon Genoese shipping by seizing merchant vessels off the
coast of the Levant. However, he returned to grant his home city aid in January 1380.
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Zeno quickly surrounded the Genoese forces in Chioggia. The Venetian counterattack on
Chioggia is noteworthy in naval history as the first known use of gunpowder to bombard
a city from ships. 142 Venetian bombards killed the ever confident Pietro Doria. 143
The Venetians turned the tables on the Genoese and starved them into peace
negotiations in June of 1380. Padua and the Hungarians faded from Genoa’s side and
Venice secured its adjacent mainland. However, the Venetians “avoided defeat” rather
than secured victory at Chioggia. 144 Venice narrowly escaped a Genoese occupation and
did not possess the manpower nor a sufficient supply of seasoned timber to continue a
naval offensive. The war concluded with the signing of the Treaty of Turin in 1381. The
provisions of the treaty were unfavorable to Venice. The Venetians granted Trieste its
freedom under the condition of a yearly tribute and ceded the economically important and
strategic island of Tenedos to Genoa. 145 The war itself left Venice without allies and in
order to broker an alliance with Austria, the Venetians gifted Treviso to Leopold III. The
Venetians lost direct control of the resources of the mainland, including timber.
Wars with Milan, Hungaria, Genoa, and the Carraresi family resulted in a series
of defeats that made Venice reevaluate the security of Treviso and its mainland timber
supply. These defeats only strengthened the Venetian resolve. After the Genoese
occupation of Chioggia, the Venetian citizens declared, “Let us arm ourselves; let use
equip and mount what galleys we have in the Arsenale. Let us go forth; it is better to
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perish in the defence of our country than to perish here through want.” 146 The most direct
repercussion of wars with Genoa, Milan, and Hungaria was Venice’s abandonment of a
passive system of management of the mainland. The establishment of new ministers and
the direct confrontation with the Carraresi illustrated Venice’s newfound commitment to
the mainland.
The War of Chioggia not only eliminated the Venetians from the timber trade of
Northeastern Italy, but also reshaped the Venetian government. The Venetians formed the
Collegio in 1380 in an attempt to truncate the formulation of war policy. The Collegio
consisted of six ministers (Savii Grandi) of war, finance, and maritime possessions. 147
The ministers expedited policy-making on matters of small consequence, but deferred to
the Great Council on more important policy issues. 148 The establishment of the Collegio
was a form of Venetian reactive policy. Venetian timber policy in the fourteenth century
was also reactive because the timber legislation of 1350 and 1372 attempted to remedy an
existing problem.
The Peace of Turin largely ignored the wishes of the Carraresi family. Francesco
de Carrara sought to extend Padua’s influence over Treviso. Carrara besieged Treviso in
1382 and the Austrians, rather than fund an expensive defense of the city, sold the city to
Padua. 149 The purchase of Treviso granted the Carraresi control over the most lucrative
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trade route on the mainland. The Carraresi also acquired important timber-producing
settlements like Belluno and Feltre. In one move, Padua purchased the entire Venetian
mainland for 100,000 ducats. 150 The Carraresi purchase of Treviso and Cadore irritated
the Venetians. 151 The family consistently challenged Venetian presence on the mainland
and disrupted the flow of goods from the mainland into the city. Reacquiring control of
mainland timber markets required the elimination of Padua’s ascending power and, if
need be, the Carraresi family.
The Venetians lacked the financial means to prevent the seizure of Treviso and
allowed the city to fall under the influence of Padua. The Carraresi looked to expand their
influence west in 1378 with an alliance with Gian Galeazzo of the Milanese Visconti. 152
Both families attacked Verona and Vicenza under an agreement to split the territories
after the campaign. Milan, however, reneged on the agreement and occupied both cities.
The Venetians likely realized that Milan was also anxious about a strong mainland power
centered at Padua. 153 Venice reluctantly accepted Milanese proposals for an alliance
against Padua. Venetian Galleons attacked Padua by sailing up the Brenta and, with the
aid of the Milanese, deposed Francesco in 1388. His son, Francesco Novello, succeeded
him as signori of Padua. 154
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Novello completed Venice’s task for them by retaking Padua from the Milanese
in 1390. The Venetians admitted Novello into the Venetian nobility and provided him
with full citizenship.155 Venice rarely granted mainland families admission into the
Venetian nobility and Novello was an exception. The Republic clearly viewed the
Novello-led Carraresi family as an ally in the 1390s. 156 Novello did not hinder the timber
trade near Padua and Treviso and was more concerned with confronting Milanese
expansion. The Venetians used Padua and the Carraresi as a buffer between themselves
and Milan.
Venice ultimately regained Treviso in a peace settlement between Milan, Padua,
and Florence in 1392. Keen Venetian diplomacy allowed the Republic to regain the
important timber city of Treviso without engaging in a costly war. After regaining
Treviso, the Venetian Republic demonstrated a ruthless, but systematic, calculus in their
treatment of the Carraresi. The death of Gian Galeazzo in 1402 weakened Milan and
diminished Venice’s obligation to maintain its relationship with Padua and Francesco
Novello. The Carraresi still wished to amend the conditions of the Peace of Turin and
Novello attempted to expand westward. Novello only needed to give the Venetians the
slightest excuse for the Republic to move against him. The disfigurement of a Venetian
envoy by Novello prompted the Venetians to turn on the Carraresi family. The Republic
invested in a campaign of “diplomacy, bribery, terror, and war” to eliminate the
Carrresi. 157 After much political maneuvering, the Venetians attacked and quickly sacked
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Padua in 1404. Venice captured and imprisoned Novello and his sons during the siege of
Padua.
The capture of the Carraresi family provided the Venetians with several options.
They could cloister Novello and his sons, but his influence in Padua made such a choice
problematic. The Carraresi consistently interfered with Venetian commerce and the
security of the mainland. The offenses of the Carraresi line fell upon Novello and his
sons. The elimination of the family allowed the Venetians to solidify the security of
Treviso and the mainland timber trade. Thus, the Venetians terminated the Carraresi line
by strangling Novello and his sons with a crossbow string in January of 1406. 158 The
execution of an entire family was an entirely new tactic of Venetian diplomacy and
signified Venetian commitment to the mainland and its timber resources.
The wars with Padua, Hungaria, and Genoa required Venetian involvement in the
politics on the mainland, yet the destruction of the Carraresi line was a stark departure
from traditional Venetian diplomacy and served as a turning point for Venetian relations
with the mainland. As noted, Venice usually settled political conflicts on the mainland by
peaceful means. 159 With the execution of Novello, Venice illustrated its commitment to
the security of Treviso and the city’s commercial connections. The Venetian treatment of
the memory of the Carraresi was also unprecedented. The Council of Ten declared
damnatio memoriae, “a condemnation of memory,” on the Carrara name in Padua. The
Venetians removed family memorials and replaced them with St. Mark’s Lion. Dead men
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not only wage no wars, but also do not interrupt commerce. 160 The beginning of Venice’s
conquest of Terraferma rests with the execution of the Carraresi.
Venetian expansion into Terraferma in the beginning of the fifteenth century
followed a concerted plan with two objectives. The first objective was bolstering the
security of the lagoon. An expanded Terraferma provided Venice with added security
against mainland powers. The second objective was the expansion of commerce on the
mainland. Fortresses on the region’s major rivers not only provided protection to
Terraferma, but also monitored Venetian commerce. Controlling the mainland granted
the Venetian patriciate more opportunities for economic expansion. Venetian patrician
families invested in the mainland since the eleventh century and the conquest of
Terraferma granted these families more connections to the mainland through government
posts and marriages. 161
In the beginning of the fifteenth century, timber and foodstuffs were the most
important commercial products of the mainland. 162 The addition of Padua, Verona, and
Vicenza in 1404 through 1406 granted the Venetians direct access to the timber trades of
the Adige and Brenta. The Venetian administration of Padua was in stark contrast to
other Terraferma polities. When the Venetians first annexed Treviso in 1339, Venice
allowed the city to keep most of its political customs and laws. Venice dismantled
Padua’s political system and imposed Venetian law upon the city. Venetian timber
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legislation followed a similar pattern of first granting concessions and later, in the
fifteenth century, obtaining direct control of the mainland’s timber resources.
The Venetians also managed their mainland armies in a different manner after the
conquest of Padua, Vicenza, and Verona. Instead of disbanding mercenary troops in the
winter, Venice maintained troops in Vicenza for several years after 1406. A brief war
with Hungaria in the 1410s demonstrated Venice’s shift to a permanent standing force in
Terraferma. 163 The Terraferma army was composed of mercenaries who proved their
reliability, at least to the Venetian Senate, with the seizure of Rovereto in 1416. Rovereto
not only possessed excellent stands of beech for use in the Arsenale, but also allowed the
Venetians to control the commerce of the middle portion of the Adige. The Venetian
employment of mercenaries differed from other Italian cities. Venice established a “cadre
of permanent condottieri,” unlike the temporary mercenary commanders employed by
Milan and Florence. 164
Conflict with Milan in the 1420s also resulted in the acquisition of prime
timberland for the Venetian Arsenale. Milanese expansion into Romagna forced Florence
to seek an alliance with Venice in 1423. The three cities dominated Northern Italy, yet
the rapid expansion of the Visconti dominions under the late Gian Galeazzo illustrated
Milan’s potential to dominate Northern Italy. An alliance with Florence would allow the
Venetians to stymie Milan’s power on the Western border of the new acquisition on the
mainland. Yet, not all Venetians favored the recent expansion into Terraferma. Tommaso
Mocenigo, the ailing ex-doge, cautioned against further expansion on the mainland. He
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acknowledged the commercial prosperity of the mainland, but warned the Venetians
against turning their back upon the sea. 165 The newly elected doge, Francesco Foscari,
concluded that Milan represented a real threat to Terraferma and the Venetians allied
with the Florentines. The alliance with Florence allowed the Venetians to check Milanese
power and acquire Bergamo and Brescia in 1428. Bergamo and Brescia were well within
Milan’s sphere of influence and served as the western terminus of Venetian Terraferma.
The annexation of Bergamo and Brescia concluded a coordinated effort by the
Venetians to secure their mainland frontier and its commercial products. Although
Terraferma evolved out of Venetian commercial connections to the mainland, the War of
Chioggia served as the springboard for Venetian expansion. Wars with Genoa, Padua,
and Hungaria in the late fourteenth century illustrated the fragility of the city’s
commercial ties to the mainland and also revealed Treviso’s vulnerability to foreign
interference. Setbacks against these rival powers induced Venice to develop a foreign
policy that coupled frontier security with resource conservation.
Firewood and timber shortages also placed pressure on the Venetian government.
Combined with constant foreign conflict, these timber shortages opened a policy window
for forest regulation in the 1350s and 1370s. The forest laws of 1350 and 1372 were
limited to market regulations because the Venetians lacked the legal precedence to
control mainland timber resources. The ultimate conquest of Terraferma, between the
executions of the Carraresi in 1406 and the annexation of Bergamo in 1428, granted
Venice control of all of the six important timber rivers. In a matter of thirty years, the
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Arsenale’s access to forest resources expanded from a near-permanent closure of the
market to a selection of the best timber of the Po River watershed. However, an
incorporation of a mainland polity into Venetian Terraferma did not entitle Venice to
direct control of the polity’s timber resources. Many Terraferma cities willingly
incorporated themselves into the Venetian Republic in exchange for protection from
other mainland powers. 166 The conquest of Terraferma served only as the foundation for
direct Venetian control of the timber resources of the mainland. The key to Venice’s
dominance of Terraferma forests rested with the development of Venetian forest law in
the fifteenth century.
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CHAPTER III: THE LEGAL CONQUEST OF TERRAFERMA’S TIMBER
RESOURCES

In 1569, a Florentine visitor to the city of St. Mark gibed that Venetian laws “are
often altered and fundamentally changed-- hence the truth of the saying, Parte venetiana
dura una settimana. Seven days suffice before time obscures a Venetian law.” 167 The
anonymous Florentine placed little faith in the Venetian legal system and was quite
possibly vexed at Venice’s success in comparison to the dismantled Florentine Republic.
The Florentine’s comments on Venetian law in the middle of the sixteenth century serves
as a nice lens into the development of Venetian forest law during the fifteenth century.
The Florentine questioned the efficacy of the Venetian legal system, yet Venetian forest
law developed into an efficient system of state-owned forest reserves. By the end of the
fifteenth century, Venice’s forest laws dominated the timber of communal forests in
Terraferma and ultimately illustrated the fallacies of the Florentine’s critique.
Early Venetian forest legislation addressed timber market conditions within
Venice. The 1350 and 1372 laws focused on oak and beech; the two most important and
most scarce timber species for Arsenale ship production. In the fourteenth century, the
Great Council and the Council of Ten only possessed the authority to regulate timber
market conditions within the sestieri. These market controls laid the legal foundation for
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more substantial Venetian forest policy in the fifteenth century. Venetian forest policy
evolved from these market edicts into the 1476 Forest Laws, which controlled local
communities’ access to timber stands. However, Venice’s role as protector of the
mainland required Venice to first modify the language of its dominion over Terraferma
before claiming legal dominion over the mainland’s forests. Likewise, acquiring legal
rights to mainland timber resources required the Venetians to insert themselves into
Terraferma legal traditions.
The Venetians’ first attempt to control Terraferma timber occurred in June 1410.
The Doge, Michele Steno, reminded the Venetian podestá of Belluno to promote the flow
of timber out of the Upper Piave and into the Arsenale. 168 Steno’s remarks to the podestá
questioned who legally owned the forests around Belluno. Many of the Terraferma
polities, including Belluno, possessed very little legal precedence to dictate who or what
entity could control their forest resources. Steno’s request signified Venice’s initial
attempt to fill the legal vacuum on forest ownership left by local Roman-based civil
codes, statuti. The Bellunese podestá’s compliance on the matter did not indicate that
Venice possessed sole ownership of Belluno’s forests. Rather, the letter revealed that the
Venetian government possessed a concerted interest in the forests around Belluno and
wished to secure usufructory rights for their timber merchants.
In the early fifteenth century, the relationship between Venice and its mainland
possessions was not clearly defined. In the 1420s the Venetians began to cement their
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superior position over Terraferma polities. As Michael Knapton claimed, the “language
of dominion” in Terraferma changed in the early 1420s. 169 Venice no longer referred to
itself as a commune. 170 The use of commune in Renaissance law and correspondence
signified Venice’s nearly equal stature in dealing with Treviso in the fourteenth century.
During the 1420s, the Venetians started to refer to their state as a dominium or signoria
(Lordship). 171 The fifteenth century Venetian mind associated dominium with Roman
ideas of imperium. 172 The often cited Ciceronian definition of imperium (“without which
they [the Roman State] cannot wage war, govern military affairs, possess armies…”)
does not suffice to describe Venice’s new language of dominion in the 1420s. 173
Republican Roman law, specifically the Lex Curiata, conferred the power of imperium.
The Venetians followed a similar path in the fifteenth century to gain control over the
timber resources of Terraferma polities. The shift from Commune to Signoria expressed
Venice’s sovereignty over Terraferma and formalized Venice’s authority over mainland
polities.
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Figure 3.1:

Serenissima Signoria c. 1423

Venetian expansion at the beginning of the fifteenth century influenced the
structure of the Venetian government in a similar fashion as the War of Chioggia. In
1420, the Savii Grandi expanded by adding five secretaries of the mainland (Savii de
Terraferma). The addition of five Terraferma secretaries granted the Collegio a steering
committee for Terraferma legislation, including timber laws. The expansion of the
Collegio to incorporate the Savii de Terraferma not only illustrated Venice’s commitment
to the mainland, but also clearly demonstrates how the annexation of mainland polities
changed the composition of the Venetian government. The Savii de Terraferma funneled
legislation related to the security of the Republic directly to the Collegio. Such important
legislation included forest legislation because the Venetians tied timber directly into the
sovereignty of the Signoria.

74
Venetian policymakers understood timber in a very different manner than modern
historians and foresters. 174 Legname (timber) “simply meant ships” to the Venetian
legislative bodies. 175 The Venetian Republic limited its definition of timber to the
specific species necessary for ship production. Timber language in the Venetian sources
articulates the connection between oaks and beech to the stability and security of the
Republic. 176 In Venice, it was accepted knowledge that “oak is the first importance to our
republic.” 177 The Venetians did not separate the security of the Republic and forest
legislation. The Venetian perception of timber and security partially explains why the
powers associated with Terraferma forest laws grew incrementally in the fifteenth
century.
The Venetians issued a statement (capitulum) upon the annexation of a mainland
city that often upheld the community’s local laws (statuti). However, the Venetians
modified the laws of cities that proved to be problematic, like the aforementioned Padua.
The Venetians allowed many of the timber-rich settlements to keep their local legal
traditions after their incorporation into Terraferma. Timber-rich polities like Treviso and
Belluno kept their local laws after Venetian annexation. Venice and its mainland cities
differed on what legal powers incorporation into Terraferma entitled Venice to absorb.
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The conflict originated in the differences in Northeastern Italy’s Roman legal heritage
and Venice’s more flexible Byzantine legal code.
The Venetians possessed a well-defined written system of laws. Like Venice
itself, Venetian law comprised both Byzantine and Roman elements. Yet, Byzantine law
formed the greater part of the Venetian legal system. The Venetians adapted their early
legal system from Justinian’s corpus juris. The Justinian Code primarily addressed jus
civile, “citizen law,” but also included important examples of law that governed natural
resources. The closest example of what scholars would consider environmental law was
Justinian’s public trust doctrine of coastlines. The public trust in Venice was most clearly
articulated in the Venetian treatment of the waters of the lagoons and not in the timber
resources of Terraferma. 178 Venice’s Byzantine legal heritage provided the Republic with
an adaptable system of laws.
In comparison, Roman law was rigid and lacked the ability to modify with
empirical evidence. Roman law should be classified as rigid because the Romans, and
their successors, attempted to apply universal legal statutes to myriad Mediterranean
cultures. 179 Roman law addressed timber from as early as the establishment of the Twelve
Tables. 180 Yet, most of the timber laws found in the Republican era governed residential
construction timber and not ship building timber. The Venetians implemented Roman
legal concepts on sovereignty and citizenship as a means to insert their claims to
mainland timber.
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Venetian expansion onto the mainland required the city to become more
familiarized with Terraferma’s Roman legal tradition. Unlike the rigidity of Roman law,
based on codified precedence, Venetian law easily adapted to the mainland’s legal
plurality. 181 The Roman legal heritage of many mainland cities did not specifically
address the ownership of common forestland, but did illuminate which entity held
jurisdiction over a community’s natural resources. Venice was familiar with the
administration of cities that possessed gray areas in their legal codes. Crete and Coron
(Koroni, Greece) both lacked a written code of laws before the Venetians annexed them
in the thirteenth century. 182 Venice established legal systems in Crete and Messenia,
whereas the Italian mainland already possessed written bodies of law. The strong legal
tradition of mainland cities required the Venetians to manipulate Roman legal concepts in
order to assert their interests in mainland timber supplies.
Civitas was the most important legal concept brought forth from the Roman era
for the legal relationship between Venice and its Terraferma polities. Civitas included the
citizens (cives) of a sovereign polity, and is best defined as a settlement’s authority to
enact laws, administer justice, and tax its cives without the approval of suzerain. Many of
Venice’s fifteenth century Terraferma cities referred to themselves as a civitas. 183 The
title granted the mainland settlements jurisdiction over a district and its natural resources.
However, in the early fifteenth century, the Venetians began not to recognize the rights to
timber resources associated with civitas. Upholding the civitas of mainland cities would
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reinforce a local community’s claim to the administration of usufructuary rights of their
natural resources, including timber. Steno’s 1410 letter was the first in a series of steps
that challenged the ownership of mainland forests and divested the control of timber
resources from local mainland communities.
Polities that possessed a clearly defined Civitas challenged the Venetians on the
mainland. The rapid expansion of Venetian Terraferma brought the Republic into conflict
with the Milanese in 1425. Fillipo Maria’s string of victories over Florentine armies in
Romagna encouraged the Florentines to seek Venetian aid once again. The Florentine
envoy to Venice relied on sophistic rhetoric and bolstered claims that if Milan was left
unchecked, the Visconti Viper would strip the liberty away from mainland cities. Their
rhetoric would make their fellow Florentine Petrarch proud, but only vexed the
Venetians. The always pragmatic Venetians curtly responded that “there are several
reasons which render it undesirable to launch out into hostilities.” 184 Yet Lorenzo Ridolfi,
one of the Florentine diplomats, won over Doge Francesco Foscari by warning that
Milanese expansion threatened Terraferma. Foscari asserted to the Collegio that it was
Venice’s responsibility to defend the liberties of the mainland. Foscari asked, “Is it not
our place to aid the distressed and jeopardized power? Shall we allow Filippo to lay a
finger on the liberties of Florence…I say that the Venetian Empire ought not to remain a
passive spectator of the present contest.” 185 Foscari’s remarks on defending Florentine
liberty enhanced the myth of Venice and contradicted Steno’s manipulation of Belluno in
1410. The Venetians certainly protected Terraferma polities, but these polities sacrificed
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certain liberties for Venetian protection. With Steno’s request to Belluno, one of these
sacrificed freedoms was a community’s ownership over forest resources.
The 1425 Florentine alliance precipitated a series of wars between Venice and
Milan in the 1420s and 1430s. Venetian expansion onto the mainland strengthened a
“natural hatred” between St. Mark’s Republic and Milan. 186 The Milanese-Venetian wars
in Lombardy quickly became a naval conflict. Venetian galleons, specifically designed
for riverine warfare, patrolled the Adige and Adda rivers. Armed with cannon, the
Venetians captured several strategic forts along the Adige and relieved the besieged
Brescians by bombarding the Milanese from Lake Garda. 187 Not to be outdone, Filippo
Maria attempted to destroy Venice’s naval capacity by setting the Arsenale ablaze.
Fortunately for Venice, the Arsenale workers prevented the burning of the Arsenale and
quickly caught the arsonist. Marino Sanuto related that the Venetians tortured him to
death because of the Arsenale’s central importance to the Venetian Republic. 188 The
Venetian galleons on Lake Garda contributed to the success of the Florentine-Venetian
siege of Brescia and forced the Milanese to sue for peace in 1426.
The first Lombard war with Milan concluded in 1428 with the peace of Ferrara.
Milan ceded Bergamo and Brescia to Venice in 1428. The Venetians granted the
Brescians a wide range of freedoms that it withheld from the timber cities of Treviso and
Belluno. Indeed, Brescia lost control of its civil offices, but unlike Belluno, retained
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jurisdiction over its rural hinterland (contadi). 189 Brescia possessed stands of oak and
beech that were appropriate for the Arsenale, but posed transportation difficulties. The
accessibility of timber in the contadi of Treviso and Belluno granted the Venetians some
incentive to control how both settlements governed their rural districts.
Brescia’s position near the western terminus of Terraferma and its proximity to
Milan allowed the Viscontis to besiege the city in 1438. The Brescians repelled the
Milanese siege with the aid of Venetian commanders. Brescia viewed the Venetians as
liberators, whose “virtues equaled, if not surpassed, those of the Romans.” 190 Such
statements by distant Terraferma polities aided Doge Foscari’s vision for Venice as the
protector of Terraferma liberty. Maintaining the image as protector required the
Venetians to implement tactful and less intrusive timber policies in the early fifteenth
century. Steno’s 1410 letter is an example of Venice’s approach. Steno requested, “on
account of the complaints having been made by our timber merchants… We request ye
[the Cadorini] to accept my recommendation concerning the timber merchants by
yielding to their requests.” 191 Venetian timber policy was a reflection of the changing
political relationships between Venice and Terraferma polities. As Venice defined its
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political control of the mainland more concretely in the middle of the fifteenth century,
the formulation of timber policy became more fully articulated and intrusive.
Venice’s role as liberator of Terraferma contradicted the Republic’s manipulation
of law for timber resources, thus maintaining positive relations with mainland
communities was a component of Venetian timber policy. Other mainland powers closely
examined Venetian annexations of mainland settlements. Although the extermination of
the Carraresi family was an unprecedented move by the Venetians, the Carraresi
thoroughly irritated the Florentines as well. Some Florentines concluded that Da Carrara
earned his fate. 192 Milan and Florence annexed neighboring polities in a similar fashion
and it was hypocritical for both cities to criticize Venice. Such claims contradicted
Florentine actions, because the Florentines often required their subjects to conduct
elaborate acts of homage. 193 The Florentine and Venetian Republics justified their
conquests as a means to protect “one’s own libertas against real or hypothetical
attacks.” 194 The Venetians and Florentines allied against Milan to protect their civic and
political freedoms. Florence slew its Goliath in Milan, but was unable to capitalize on the
war like the Venetians. The Florentines questioned the necessity of Venice’s annexation
of Brescia and asked themselves if Venice intended to annex Milan next. 195 Venice’s
relationships with other mainland powers directly influenced the security of Terraferma.
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Likewise, Venice’s relationships with timber polities was important for maintaining the
Arsenale’s timber supply.
Venice developed its relationships with each mainland polity separately. The
Venetians incorporated settlements into Terraferma generally by three methods. Each
method greatly dictated the city’s future relationship with Venice. Cities often willed
themselves to Venice for military protection and commercial ties. Treviso and Belluno
both voluntarily relinquished their civitas and Venice incorporated these polities into
Terraferma. Direct conquest during wars with neighboring powers served as the second
method of Venetian annexation. The Venetians annexed Venzone, Udine, and other
important timber centres in Friuli in wars with Hungaria. The outright purchase of cities
served as the third method Venice used to incorporate cities into its mainland holdings.
Buying cities was less expensive than hiring condottieri to take the city by force. The
Venetians often applied this method to annex cities outside of Terraferma. For example,
Venice purchased Corfu in 1384 and, as previously mentioned, Dalmatia in 1409. 196
Sigismund’s contestation of Dalmatia forced the Venetians to legitimize their
purchase with force. After a protracted war, Venice wrested Dalmatia from Sigismund in
1437. The conquest of Dalmatia granted the Arsenale another avenue for timber
resources. Venice claimed an interest in Dalmatian forests relatively quickly by the right
of conquest. Venetian political language clearly portrayed Venice as holding legal
possession over important Dalmatian timber ports. 197 Yet, Dalmatian timber was
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expensive and Venetian shipbuilders considered it “to be of lesser quality.” 198 The
Venetians developed a policy of acquiring legal ownership of mainland forests, partially
because Dalmatia could not supply all of the Arsenale’s ship-timber needs. Terraferma
polities provided the Venetians with the least expensive and most readily accessible
Arsenale-grade timber.
A timber shortage in the 1430s and 1440s encouraged the development of new
forms of timber policy. The shortage included ship-timber, but centered upon firewood
for heating and Venetian industries. The Council of Ten commissioned several patricians
to monitor the conditions of forests along the Piave, Sile, and Tagliamento. 199 One of the
inspectors, Marco Corner, published an important treatise on the conditions of
Terraferma’s forest in 1442. Corner’s treatise opens a window into how the Venetian
mind understood Terraferma timber and forest conservation. Corner also illustrated that
the Venetians possessed relatively accurate knowledge of the health of Terraferma’s
riparian forests.
Appuhn described the document as remarkably technical, but flawed in its
interpretation of Terraferma’s timber landscapes. He also stated that Corner’s treatise
“clearly demonstrates that after nearly four decades of mainland rule, the Venetians still
knew relatively little about the sources of the city’s timber and fuel.” 200 Such an
assessment is an unfair appraisal of Venetian forest knowledge. Venetian correspondence
to the podestás of timber settlements indicates the Venetian government’s familiarity
with the sources of Arsenale and fuel timber. Steno’s 1410 letter specifically addressed
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the relationship between Belluno and Venetian timber merchants. Appuhn questioned
whether the Venetian policymakers comprehended the issues facing their Terraferma
forests. Corner’s treatise and the anonymous 1413 work on Terraferma timber indicate
that Venetians knew much more about their forests than other Renaissance naval powers.
In 1413, an anonymous treatise detailed the deteriorating condition of Terraferma
forest resources. 201 Deforestation was the most pressing concern for the Arsenale’s shiptimber supply. The treatise asserts that mainland deforestation occurred with the Venetian
conquest. 202 The author illustrated the Venetian patriciate’s technical knowledge of
Terraferma’s forests by connecting the denudation of forest resources with the siltation of
rivers. The 1413 work demonstrates a comprehension of the connections between
unsustainable timber harvest techniques and water-induced soil erosion. The Dalmatian
timber ports experienced a similar spike in soil erosion due, in part, to timber harvests. 203
Widespread soil erosion induced by forest use was not just limited to Terraferma. 204 The
anonymous report also suggested replanting the mainland’s riparian corridors as a policy
solution. The Venetian government possibly recognized deforestation, but the commune
possessed no legal authority to dictate conservation measures to cities along the Piave or
Tagliamento in the 1410s.
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Marco Corner’s 1442 report on Terraferma’s forests echoed similar problems
with deforestation of the anonymous 1413 treatise. Corner also emphasized the
deforestation of the mainland’s forests. When he presented his findings to the Collegio,
Corner suggested two policy solutions to address the denudation and subsequent siltation
of Terraferma’s watersheds. The first solution, dredging, was already in practice. 205
Corner proposed replanting the watersheds as a second solution. Corner recognized how
siltation adversely affected Venetian mainland commerce, including the timber trade. The
shallow bed of silted rivers would block the transportation of timber. An example of the
siltation of a Terraferma river occurred in the modern era. Deposits in the Tagliamento in
the past 200 years caused the river to become more shallow and braided. 206 Corner
prompted the Collegio to take more intrusive steps in order to secure timber for the
Arsenale.
Firewood shortages and Corner’s report spurred the Venetian government into a
policy of direct control of Terraferma’s forests. 207 By 1442, Venice controlled the
important timber watersheds and the Venetian government expanded in order to cement
its hold over the mainland and expedite Terraferma policy measures. The market controls
on Terraferma timber of 1350 and 1372 did not grant Venice control over the mainland’s
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forest resources. 208 However, Venice expanded its dominance over Terraferma in the
1440s and 1450s. In 1444 the Venetians removed the local military governor (Capitano)
of Cadore from his post and replaced him with a Venetian official. 209 The installation of a
Venetian to govern the contado of Cadore expanded Venice’s access to the Silver Fir
forests of Cadore and challenged the original capitulum to Cadore from 1424. The
capitulum left Cadore’s municipal council alone and granted the city relief from
commercial tariffs and taxes. 210 Cadore accepted the new military administrator because
the city depended on Venice for trade and defense. The seizure of the Cadore’s contadi
extended to Belluno and established the precedence for future Venetian revisions of
Cadorini and Bellunese local law and seizures of mainland forests.
Venetian manipulation of local laws and offices made rival Italian powers
suspicious of Venetian intentions for the mainland. Venice, Milan, and Florence
continued to dominate the politics of Northeastern Italy in the 1440s. The death of
Filippo Maria in 1447 threatened to upset the balance of power between the three cities.
The Florentines quickly grew suspicious of the Venetians and Cosimo de Medici (il
Vecchio) stirred up anti-Venetian sentiments in Florence. Cosimo’s initial outcries
against Venetian imperialism set the foundation for generations of scholars to criticize
Venice’s involvement in Terraferma. The contemporary humanist scholar Paggio
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Bracciolini blamed Venetian ambition for causing conflict between Milan and Venice. 211
Pope Pius II feared that the Venetians “would attack all of Italy” if given the chance to
annex Milan. 212 Accusations of Venetian imperialism undermined Venice’s persona as
protector of Terraferma. In response, the Venetians pointed at the imperialistic actions of
Florence and Milan. Venice expanded to ensure its own libertas and to combat “force
with force.” 213 In the absence of a strong Milan, rivalry between Florence and Venice
colored the contemporary interpretation of Venice’s growing power in Terraferma.
Terraferma’s timber resources were a part of Venice’s ascending influence on the
mainland and any outright seizure of forest resources would color the arguments over
Venetian imperialistic ambitions.
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Figure 3.2: Venetian Terraferma c. 1450. Adapted from the University of Oregon
Mapping History site (http://pages.uoregon.edu/mapplace/EU/EU19%20%20Italy/Maps/EU19_128.jpg).
The Venetians expanded their rights to Cadore’s forests in 1453. The Venetian
Senate requested that the local city council deliver a large supply of Silver Fir to the
Arsenale. Venice noted that the Republic continually granted Cadore protection and that
any assistance rendered by the alpine community would be greatly appreciated. 214 The
Senate’s tone illustrates that the local Cadorini government still controlled its forest
resources and they granted the Venetians usufructory rights. Cadore complied with the
Senate’s wishes and illustrated Venice’s growing influence over the distant timber polity.
The arrangement was not entirely imperialistic because both cities benefitted from the
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association. Cadore granted Venice access to the German markets across the Alps and
supplied the Venetians with timber and iron. The Venetians provided the Cadorini with
an outlet for their marketable goods. Mainland cities saw protection and stability in
Venetian rule, but events in the Eastern Mediterranean changed Venice’s approach to
mainland timber policy.
Successful Ottoman advances in Bulgaria and the Peloponnesus encouraged
Constantine XI to seek aid from the western Latins. The approach of the Ottoman forces
prompted several Venetians to disobey orders from the Senate in February 1453 to stay
and support the defense. 215 Likewise, the leading Venetians in Constantinople voted to
remain and support the Byzantines in their defense of the city. 216 The Venetians
demonstrated a stronger commitment to the security of the Byzantines than all other
Western Christian powers. The Senate seized the initiative and ordered five ships to the
defense of the city in April.
Two men fashioned Venetian strategy for the Eastern Mediterranean in the middle
of the fifteenth century. Doge Tomaso Mocenigo in his famous 1421 oration warned
against an expansion of Venetian involvement in mainland affairs and advocated for a
renewed focus on maritime exploits. Mocenigo’s successor, the aforementioned
Francesco Foscari, supported mainland expansion and likely did not equate mainland
wars with the ruining of the Eastern Empire. Although Foscari served as Doge during the
1450s, Venetian strategy took elements of both Mocenigo’s and Foscari’s vision for
Venetian strategy.
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Venice’s strategy in protecting the Byzantines served several purposes at once.
First, protecting Venetian trade inlets into the Black Sea required the Venetians to
maintain the tractable Byzantine leadership in Constantinople. Secondly, several hundred
Venetian merchant families resided in Constantinople. The Venetians often implemented
military force outside of Italy to protect Venetian citizens, as evidenced by their treatment
of the Native Greeks in several revolts on Candia (Crete). Lastly, a secure Eastern
Mediterranean bolstered the Trans-Alpine Terraferma trade routes.
Venice’s role as guardian of the Eastern Mediterranean’s trade networks made
Terraferma and its timber a crucial component in Venetian strategy. The Stato da Már, or
Venetian Maritime Empire, formed a symbiotic relationship with Venetian Terraferma.
Eastern markets, such as Constantinople, benefited from the Trans-Alpine trade in iron
and raw materials that hinged upon Venice. 217 Terraferma oak, fir, and beech provided
the materials for Venetian state trade vessels that conveyed luxury goods to German
markets.
A single ship silenced the entire Venetian Senate on the morning of July 29, 1453.
The ship carried news of the fall of Constantinople. The Collegio suspended the morning
session and the Venetians released courier pigeons to spread the news throughout
Northern Italy. 218 The sacking of Constantinople by the Turks placed Venetians and
citizens of Terraferma polities directly in danger. The news utterly shocked the Venetians
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who could not “believe that the Turks could bring a fleet against Constantinople.” 219 The
request for Cadorini timber was part of the preparation for war with the Turks in the east.
Likewise, the promulgation of Terraferma timber law dominates the narrative of
Venice’s relationship with the mainland in the late fifteenth century.
Timber management and policy is an underappreciated aspect of the VenetianOttoman wars. The naval engagements of Sapienza, Djerba, and Lepanto required the
consumption of at least several thousand trees. Both the Venetians and Ottomans
maintained specific policies for the acquisition of timber. The Ottomans faced similar
challenges in procuring timber as the Venetians, but it was clear to contemporary
observers that the conquest of Anatolia granted the Ottomans fine reserves of shiptimber. 220 In the 1450s, the Ottoman timber supplies seemed infinite to Christian
observers. 221 The Ottomans made the Venetians apprehensive about the security of their
Eastern Mediterranean Empire and prompted the Arsenale to stockpile ship-timber. The
Arsenale outfitted the Venetian “limes,” the string of coastal resupply ports, with oars,
gunpowder, wheat, and men. 222 The Arsenale required properly seasoned timber and
called upon the forests of Terraferma to supply it.
In 1463, the Venetians once again requested finished Silver Fir from Cadore and
Belluno. The Venetians implemented the right to reserve (diritto di reserva) in order to
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claim rights to a prime stand of Belluno fir near the Piave. Mainland Italian republics
often used the diritto di reserva to muster any unused natural resources for the defense of
the res publica. 223 Invoking the diritto expanded the previous timber rights granted to
Venice by Belluno in 1410 and Cadore in 1453, and created a mast reserve, called the
Bosca della Vizza, for the Arsenale. The act did not exclude other users from the forest
but the diritto guaranteed Venice’s usufructuory rights to Cadore’s forests. The diritto
served as Venice’s legal formalization of Steno’s 1410 letter and other similar
concessions by the Cadorini. The Bosca della Vizza reserve granted the Venetians a
guaranteed source of ship masts for future naval conflicts. The diritto served as an
important precedent for future claims to Terraferma’s timber.
The right to reserve likely originated with the Republican Roman concept of Ager
occupatorius (land annexed after victory). Land that the Roman Republic conquered fell
into the collection of Ager publici (public lands) but the Republic retained the right to
claim the land back at any time. 224 Roman land law divided usable timberland in Silvia
caedua, harvestable woodlands, and Silvia pascua, oak woodlands suitable for
rangeland. 225 The Terraferma polities inherited transmuted versions of Roman land law.
Like Roman law, the mainland settlements possessed contadi that primarily consisted of
agrian laws, with very limited laws to govern harvestable timberland. In contrast, the
Venetian legal tradition did not incorporate agrian laws, but addressed timber from the
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foundation of the city. Consummate lawyers, the Venetians implemented the dirrito di
reserva to fill the vacuum in Terraferma timber law.

Figure 3.3:

Vizza and Montello Forest Reserves. Source: Google Earth.

The dirrito di reserva only allowed the Venetians to consume unused natural
resources for the defense of the res publica during acute emergencies. Any outright
attempt to confiscate Cadore’s forests would not only irritate the Cadorini, but also
damaged Venice’s image as protector of Terraferma. In order to successfully use the
dirrito, the Venetians defined the terms unused and res publica. Several local
communities also used Cadore’s timber resources, but no legal mechanism existed that
explicitly denoted who owned Cadorini forests. The Venetians and cities incorporated
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into Terraferma distorted the meanings of res publica to secure legal rights. Some
polities, like Vicenza, claimed more local autonomy by labeling themselves a res
publica. 226 Venice followed a similar pattern by recognizing a city’s claim when it was
most convenient for the Republic.
Venice’s implementation of the dirrito di reserva in 1463 was legally justified for
three reasons. First, the timber harvested at Cadore directly contributed to the defense of
the Venetian and Terraferma polities’ res publica. Secondly, the Venetians adhered to
legal conditions set to enact the diritto. Finally, the rapid expansion of the Ottomans
granted the Venetians a legal justification for enacting the dirrito. The Ottoman conquest
of the Peloponnese constituted a state of emergency and the Collegio essentially framed
the legal question of who owns Cadore’s forests by linking it with the naval security of
the Eastern Mediterranean. 227
The Venetians developed a pattern of using Ottoman successes in the east as an
excuse to denote ship-timber reserves in Terraferma. Ottoman victories fit well within
the definition of an acute emergency and gave the Venetians the excuse to exercise the
dirrito. The Ottomans engulfed Wallachia in 1462 and Bosnia in 1463. 228 In 1469, a
Venetian merchant, Piero Dolfin, tipped off the Venetians to an imminent attack on
Negroponte by the Ottomans. 229 The Senate ordered the Arsenale to prepare the Venetian
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navy. The Arsenale drew upon Terraferma’s forests to fulfill the Senate’s orders. The
Arsenale supplied beech oars and fir masts for reserved ships and organized the
distribution of gunpowder to active ships.
The production of a Venetian vessel from harvest to outfitting was a highly
organized process that required the Arsenale to maintain secure, steady supplies of oak,
fir, and beech. The Arsenale also demanded supplies of hemp and wine, but timber was
the primary concern for Venetian suppliers. 230 Although the Arsenale possessed the
capability to crank out one fully battle-ready vessel within several hours, ship-timber
required at least several months to several years to season correctly. 231 Ship wrights
ventured into the forest to select the trees for the Arsenale. Once selected, local laborers
felled the trees and the Venetians negotiated for the transport of the specimens down one
of the major Terraferma timber rivers. Once fully seasoned, ship carpenters supervised
the cutting of the timber by the Arsenale’s sawyers. 232 Thus, the mobilization of
Negroponte’s defense placed the most pressure on Terraferma’s forests several months to
a year after 1469, once the Arsenale required green timber for the seasoning process.
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Figure 3.4:

Venetian Euboea. Adapted from Texas A&M University Nautical
Archeology 2005 Euboea Season
(http://nautarch.tamu.edu/pwss/2005%20Season/2005%20Season.html).

Negroponte was the political centre of the island of Euboea and served as the base
of operations for Venetian commercial and naval operations in the Northern Aegean. The
Ottomans began their assault on Negroponte in June 1470. Venetian witnesses described
the sheer magnitude of the Ottoman navy as “a forest upon the sea.” 233 Upon hearing
Mehmet’s initial demand for the surrender of the city, the Venetians responded “go and
eat marranos (piglets) and we shall meet you in the ditch.” 234 The Ottoman Bombards
served as Mehemt’s response to the insult. Led by the gifted lawyer Niccolò Da Canal, a
Venetian navy of 71 ships arrived to relieve the city in July. However, Da Canal was
indecisive in his attack on the vulnerable Ottoman position and fled once the Ottomans
took the city.
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The loss of Negroponte shook Venetian forest policy more than the loss of
Constantinople. Upon receiving the news, the Collegio immediately replaced Da Canal
with Pietro Mocenigo. The Venetians also sent envoys throughout Italy in order to form
an Italian-wide alliance against the Ottomans. Doge Christoforo Moro wrote to the
Milanese signori, Galeazzo-Maria Sforza, to encourage Christian unity in the face of the
virulent rise of the Muslim Ottomans. 235 Moro’s gesture allowed the Venetians to secure
the western border of Terraferma by renewing the terms of the Peace of Lodi.
Negroponte illustrated that Venice could not afford to toy with the ascending Ottoman
naval presence in the Eastern Mediterranean. The Collegio also expanded the operations
of the Arsenale. In order to supply timber for the growth of the Arsenale, the Collegio
exerted more control over Terraferma’s forests.
The Venetians implemented the dirrito di reserva to gain direct access to fir
resources, but did not yet claim legal rights to an oak forest. In 1471, the Senate invoked
the dirrito to claim a substantial oak forest near Treviso. 236 The new oak reserve was
situated on Montello, a hill ten miles west of Treviso. Montello possessed a readily
available supply of oak and its proximity to the Sile River aided the transportation of
timber to the Arsenale. The Montello ban granted the Arsenale control of a nearby supply
of their most crucial tree species and allowed the Collegio to legally claim a forest
previously owned by a Terraferma polity.
The 1471 Montello ban illustrated the change in Venice’s relationship with
Terraferma timber settlements since Steno’s letter in 1410. Steno suggested to the
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podestá of Cadore to aid Venetian timber merchants, whereas the Collegio claimed direct
authority over Montello in 1472. The use of the dirrito to claim Montello also differed
from the 1453 claim of the Bosca della Vizza near Cadore. The mast reserve at Bosca
della Vizza did not exclude other users from the fir forest. The new oak reserve at
Montello gave the Arsenale exclusive rights to the forest. The Venetians later reinforced
the Arsenale’s sole ownership of Montello by fining or whipping anyone caught entering
the forest with felling instruments. 237 Using the dirrito again allowed the Venetian
government to reinforce their legal claim to Terraferma’s forests and broadened the
authority of the dirrito. However, the broadening of the dirrito in Treviso resulted in
problems with the local populace.
The citizens of Treviso were not fond of the Venetian seizure of the Montello.
The dirrito severely limited a Trevisan’s access to the hill. Settlements around Montello
collected firewood and green fertilizer and pastured their animals there. In order to
produce firewood, villagers coppiced maturing trees. 238 Coppicing a tree permanently
rendered that specimen useless for the Arsenale. Villagers pastured their animals in the
Montello because of the forest’s abundance of chestnuts. They also pollarded trees to
produce fodder for their livestock. 239 The dirrito ended these firewood and pastoral
privileges of nearby communities. Communities could still petition the Arsenale for the
collection of firewood, but the Arsenale firmly controlled all access to Montello.
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The Venetians interpreted the “unused resources” clause of the dirritto di reserva
to justify the seizure of Montello. The Arsenale viewed Montello as strictly an oak
reserve, and not a public rangeland for Trevisan peasants. Allowing livestock, especially
pigs, to graze in the Montello was ruinous for oak seedlings. In the minds of Venetian
administrators pasturing animals in the forest made the forest an unused resource,
because making ship-timber was the best use of forest resources. 240 Certainly the local
communities used the forest resources, but the Arsenale’s goals did not support a multiuse forest model. The Arsenale intended to use Montello as the nursery for growing an
armada to face Venice’s rivals, including the Ottomans.
Almost immediately after the establishment of the Montello oak reserve, local
inhabitants resisted the Arsenale’s authority. Villagers were unwilling to relinquish the
usufructory rights to the common forest that their ancestors held since before Treviso’s
incorporation into Terraferma. Resistance took the form of cutting down Arsenale-grade
oaks, letting livestock out into the Montello, or deliberately coppicing oaks for firewood.
A monastery that dispensed alms in the middle of Montello provided more clever
individuals a handy excuse when caught in the forest by Venetian officials. Offenders
often claimed they entered into the forests to receive alms, rather than to fell timber. 241
The resistance encouraged the Venetian Senate to establish fines for trespassers in the
Montello. One Draconian fine required an unauthorized forest user to pay 25 lire di
piccolo and serve two months in prison for every piece of wood cut. 242 The fines were
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stopgap measures that only addressed issues with local users near Montello and did not
extend to other Terraferma forests. The Venetians used the Montello fines as a model to
regulate all forests capable of producing Arsenale timber.
The Senate implemented the legal precedence of the diritto di reserva to enact six
forest laws in 1476. The laws governed the usage of forest resources and placed the
Venetians in direct control of all of Terraferma’s community forests. It is best to examine
each law separately in order to more efficiently parse what each law achieved. 243 The first
law provided statutes for sustainable timber harvests. The Senate required Terraferma
community forests to annually rotate timber harvests throughout ten coupes. Thus, the
Arsenale only harvested each section of a forest once every decade. Corner’s 1442
treatise reinforced the notion that ship-timber was a finite resource. The division of
mainland forests illustrates that the Venetian government earnestly examined Corner’s
proposal, but needed to establish a legal precedence to administer all Terraferma forests.
The first law is an example of how Venetian timber policy evolved into positive
conservation measures for Terraferma’s forests. Forestry developed as “a graft on the
great rootstock of European agronomy.” 244 The rotating harvest statute allowed the
Arsenale to manage Terraferma’s community forests as a sustainable crop. In a similar
fashion as a Crimean wheat crop, the Venetians protected mainland forests until
specimens matured into a harvestable size. Corner and the anonymous 1413 treatise
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raised alarm at the deforestation of Terraferma’s forests and connected deforestation with
soil erosion. The Senate attempted to fix deforestation and soil erosion by mandating the
division of forests into coupes with the 1476 law.
The second law addressed the selling and purchasing of common forests. The
Senate forbade the sale or abandonment of any Terraferma community forest. Prior to
1476, a mainland polity could sell sections of the commons to a group of users or a single
individual. 245 The second law also built upon the regulatory fines put into place after the
Montello ban. The Venetian Senate imposed a 100 ducat fine on any polity caught selling
its common timberland. The fine was sizable for any polity, but the Venetians provided
amnesty to polities who reneged on any sale of public forests within a month of the
enactment of the 1476 laws. 246 The Venetians fully realized the difficulty in dealing with
private forest owners during timber purchases. Consolidating the ownership of forests
into the hands of local polities expedited the acquisition of ship-timber by the Arsenale.
The third law banned several destructive agricultural practices. Community
members could no longer use common forests to pasture their livestock. The law also
barred the practice of assarting forest lands. 247 The spike in population and subsequent
expansion of agricultural intensity in Terraferma contributed to the deforestation of
Arsenale timber species. Assarting timberland was a major concern for the Venetian
Arsenale because the practice permanently removed timberlands and their associated
ship-timber. The law prescribed substantial fines for any person caught assarting common
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forests. The typical fine was a payment of 100 ducats and six months of service as
rower. 248 Such punishments encouraged adherence because either the fine would indebt
the offender or the rowing would kill him.
The Venetians sought to stymie the deforestation of Terraferma’s forests with the
ban on pasturing livestock and burning off sections of the forest. The conversion of
timberland into fields increased soil erosion and aggravated the impact of precipitation. 249
The loss of the mainland forests impacted every facet of the Venetian economy.
Firewood was already a scarce commodity by the 1440s, and Venetian industries utterly
depended upon mainland charcoal producers. Soil erosion, if left unchecked, would make
portions of the mainland rivers unnavigable for trading vessels. The 1476 laws served as
positive conservation measures that attempted to halt anthropogenic environmental
degradation.
The fourth law bolstered Venice’s authority over the oak reserve at Montello. The
law required timber suppliers from Montello to transport timber directly to Venice
without stopping along the Sile to sell portions of their harvest. The law was a
commodity control measure and the Senate likely modeled it after the earlier Adriatic
cereals laws and the 1350 Arsenale selection law. Statutes of the law also provided
guidelines for fines that left offenders literally up the stream without a paddle, or in their
case, a boat. The Venetian dominance over Terraferma’s forests included control over the
exchange of timber resources. Because the Venetians closely associated timber with the
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defense of res publica, manipulation of the mainland timber market fell within the
parameters of the diritto di reserva.
The fifth law expanded Venice’s firewood warehouse near the Arsenale. The
expansion of the firewood warehouse did not directly impact the Arsenale’s forest
reserves, but the acquisition of steady supplies of firewood was necessary. The firewood
supply was a form of social welfare because the provveditori alle legne (Firewood
mangers) distributed firewood in the winter to poor residents. The Venetians experienced
a shortage of firewood well into the beginning of the fifteenth century. The third law that
prohibited assarting and pasturing livestock in forests also prevented the loss of firewood
reserves. However, the Arsenale reserves managed Terraferma forests for ship-timber,
and did not implement cutting techniques, like coppicing, to promote the growth of
firewood. No firewood managers participated in the management of Terraferma
forests. 250 The exclusion of any regulation of the firewood market within the six 1476
laws is indicative of the Arsenale’s firm control of Terraferma forest policy.
The sixth law possessed the most pervasive legal repercussions for Terraferma’s
forests. The law declared that the Arsenale’s requirements for any ship-timber species
takes precedence over any of the prior five laws. 251 Providing the Arsenale jurisdiction
over the mainland’s forests shaped how the forests of Northern Italy developed. Although
it would be difficult to determine the connection between Arsenale activities and future
forest growth patterns, Venetian forest law developed to favor a specific management
approach. The Venetian government protected oak, beech, and fir stands in order to
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provide for the defense of the res publica. The Venetians marginalized species unsuitable
for ship-timber and quite possibly contributed to the decline of endemic flora species, like
the Padua Rue.
The genesis for the 1476 forest laws resided with Venice’s initial connection to
Treviso in 1339. In the early fourteenth century, the Venetians exhibited a passive system
of management of the mainland. The Venetians afforded a wide breadth of legal rights to
Treviso. Conflict with Genoa hindered Venetian trade and induced Venetian expansion
onto the mainland in order to protect the Republic’s mainland commercial ties. Wars with
Padua, Hungaria, and Milan encouraged the Venetians to abandon their previous passive
management of the mainland and to develop a policy of resource conservation. Venice
clearly demonstrated its abandonment of its passive system of management through the
termination of the Carraresi family. Although Venetian annexations were often the result
of mainland wars, the Republic’s Terraferma policy followed a concerted plan to secure
mainland commerce and to bolster its mainland frontier. Timber was a strategic
commercial mainland resource that Venetian expansionistic polices protected.
The conquest of Terraferma did not grant Venice direct control over the
mainland’s timber resources. Dominating community forests required the Venetians to
first insert themselves into the mainland’s Roman legal heritage. In the early fifteenth
century, the Venetians began asserting their legal claims to timber into mainland law by
modifying the language of dominion, using Roman legal concepts to their advantage, and
by implementing the dirrito di reserva. Ottomon victories at Constantinople (1453) and
Negroponte (1471) granted the Venetians an appropriate excuse to extend their control of
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Terraferma timber. The dirrito allowed the Venetians to establish a beech reserve near
Belluno and Cadore in 1453 and an oak reserve at Montello near Treviso in 1471.
The six forest laws of 1476 were a continuation of the Arsenale’s successful
attempts to expand its legal rights to mainland forests between 1410 and 1471. The six
laws provided the guide for all future Venetian forest laws. The Florentine who remarked
that Venetian laws last for seven days was certainly not a student of Venetian forest laws.
Venetian law afforded the Arsenale legal authority over key ship-timber stands that lasted
well into the eighteenth century. The dispossession of the rights of previous local forest
users always handicapped the Arsenale’s ability to procure appropriate timber specimens,
but nevertheless throughout the late fourteenth and fifteenth centuries the Venetians
developed a corpus of forest laws that granted the Arsenale legal control of forest
resources.
The origins of the 1476 laws resided with two Venetians decisions in the
fourteenth century. First, the decision to annex Treviso in 1339 signified Venice’s
willingness to solidify market connections to the mainland. Although Venice did not
annex Treviso simply for the mainland’s timber trade, Treviso’s favorable role as conduit
of the Sile and lower Piave timber trade was a crucial benefit afforded to Venice. Second,
Venice veered from its passive management of Treviso and the mainland with the
execution of the Carraresi family in 1406. The execution was unprecedented in Venetian
history and serves as the most appropriate starting point for periodizing Venetian
Terraferma. Conflicts with the Carraresi, Genoa, and Milan illustrated chinks in the
Venetian mainland armour and, in response, Venice formulated a program of mainland
protection and resource conservation.
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Venetian expansion onto the mainland did not directly divest local communities’
ownership of forest resources. The Venetian Republic acquired rights to mainland timber
by inserting its claims into Terraferma’s legal heritage. The manipulation of local statutes
for the domination of natural resources was not a new Venetian tactic and was likely
perfected with the development of Venice’s legal control of the Adriatic wheat trade in
the eleventh century. Venice’s role as protector of the mainland required the Republic to
modify its language of dominion in order to grant the city a firm legal grounding for
outright seizures of timber in 1463 at Vizza and in 1471 at Montello near Treviso. The
bans at Montello and Vizza resulted in positive forest conditions for the Arsenale, but
upset disenfranchised local forest users.
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EPILOGUE: “WHO OWNS THE FOREST?”

Ultimately, the narrative of Venetian forest law provides modern foresters and
policymakers with valuable lessons in forest policymaking. In 1910, the European-trained
father of American Forestry Gifford Pinchot declared that America was experiencing a
timber carestia, or famine. “America has already crossed the verge of a timber famine so
severe that its blighting effects will be felt in every household in the land.” 252 Pinchot
echoed the sentiments of Marco Corner’s 1442 report to the Venetian Senate. Venetian
timber shortages in the 1340’s and 1440’s disrupted fire fuel supplies and in part,
encouraged the promulgation of timber regulations. Venice’s first timber regulations
targeted the timber market within Venice because the Republic did not yet possess the
legal authority on the mainland.
The Venetian conquest of Terraferma and the Republic’s manipulation of
mainland law slowly answered the same question facing American forests in the early
twentieth century: “Who owns the forest?” Pinchot’s utilitarian vision for America’s
forests served as America’s response. That is, “using the forest first for the greatest good
of the present generation, and then for the greatest good of succeeding generations.” 253
Fifteenth century Venetians reached a conclusion through in an entirely different mode of
thinking. Venice valued timber for its role in the defense of the Republic and
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implemented the dirrito to assert that the Arsenale legally owned common timberland for
the defense of Terraferma. The manner in which the Venetians and twentieth century
utilitarians defined forest ownership provides modern foresters and policymakers with
valuable lessons.
That societal needs often influence forest conditions is the first valuable lesson.
Modern foresters often fall back upon their scientific training to fix forest problems and
neglect the societal conditions that first caused the problem. The dominance of the
Arsenale within Venetian forest law was a reflection of timber’s direct role in the
Republic’s security. Likewise, the purpose of Venetian silviculture was to produce a
forest with specimens suitable for the Arsenale. The Venetians fixed their timber problem
by manipulating mainland law at the expense of local timber users.
Local communities immediately reacted to Venetian timber policies by skirting
around the 1476 law. As aforementioned, forest users near the Montello used the church
within the reserve as an excuse to enter the forest with felling tools. As Appuhn asserted,
if the Venetians upset local communities enough, harvesters simply sabotaged the
harvest. 254 The distrust of the Venetian reserve system by local forest users illustrates that
all forest users should be incorporated within the development of forest policy. American
foresters encountered a similar problem in the early twentieth century when an elite class
of technically trained scientists governed the usage of Western national forests.
Like the Venetians, early Americans concerned themselves with specific species
of oak. Ship-timber was a key resource for the newly founded Republic. Shipwrights
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specifically sought out suitable specimens of Southern Live Oak (Quercus virens). 255
Congress also reserved stands of timber in the early nineteenth century in order to
provide timber to the naval yards at Philadelphia and Boston. 256 Although the
conservation of timber resources in America began well before the twentieth century, the
first federal system of American forest reserves did not develop until the late nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries.
The creation of America’s forest reserves in 1891 also came at the expense of
local forest users. Industry’s reaction to the creation of National Forests is well
documented by historians, but little scholarship examines how the new forests affected
localized forest usage. 257 The Forest Management Act of 1897 (Organic Act) restricted
grazing, harvesting, and mining, all of which were typical usage patterns for western
forests of the late nineteenth to early twentieth centuries. The new timber policy
disgusted miners and, especially, ranchers who secured concessions within the Organic
Act. 258
In a similar fashion to fifteenth century Trevisans, American ranchers refused to
allow bureaucrats to modify their rights to timberland. “Eastern college men,” like
William Greeley, now dictated forest usage to ranchers. 259 Here the question was not
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“Who owns the Forest?” but “Who can use the Forest?” Livestock owners far
outnumbered commercial harvest operations during this era. 260 However, American
ranchers succeeded where Trevisan peasants could not by securing grazing rights to
federal forestland with a permit system. Such broad comparisons are often problematic,
but can serve as a viable avenue for future directions of research.
Examining the history of American forests elicits some similarities between the
Terraferma narrative and the American colonial experience as well. The British of the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries essentially used the American colonies for timber in
a similar fashion as Venice utilized Terraferma’s timber resources. Robert Albion’s
Forests and Sea Power examined the role forests and forest policy played in the English
Navy from the military dictatorship of Oliver Cromwell to the battle of Hampton
Roads. 261 The preservation of American oaks and pines concerned the British Naval
Board. Parliament, according to Albion, passed several laws to preserve American timber
for the production of war vessels in Boston. 262 The loss of the American colonies forced
the British to look to other sources for shiptimber. One of these foreign sources was
Italy. During the Napoleonic wars, the Italian states harvested their timber for the British
and French fleets. 263 British reliance on Italian timber was so crucial that by 1814 “nearly
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half of the oak on hand in the dockyards was from Italy.” 264 The British sought timber
from abroad due to the mismanagement and denudation of its native oaks. 265
Investigating the Arsenale’s role in the denudation of the Po River Valley is
another future avenue for further research. A subsection of forest histories devote
themselves solely to examining the occurrence of denudation of Mediterranean forests.
J.V. Thirgood asserted that the exploitation of forest resources for ship-timber resulted in
regional deforestation. 266 The major focus of Thirgood’s study was the Levant and
Cyprus, yet he addressed the importance of timber in the ascendancy of Venice by
stating, “the Italian maritime states of Venice, Genoa and other cities…were launched at
the expense of Mediterranean forests.” 267 More specifically, Venetian maritime might
was launched at the expense of Terraferma communities. Control of the timber supplies
of the Po River Valley was essential to Venetian power. Studying the Arsenale’s
dependency on mainland supplies of timber can answer questions about Venice’s
political relationship with the polities of Terraferma.
Russell Meiggs’s Trees and Timber in the Ancient Mediterranean World
established a solid foundation for recent inquires into forest histories. Mieggs’s work on
ancient timber builds upon the research of Lionel Casson and R.C. Anderson by adding
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forest history into the narrative of trireme construction. 268 He does not blame the classical
civilizations for overharvesting most of the Mediterranean forests. Certain regions like
Attica and Sicily were deforested, but Mieggs asserts that wide portions of the
Mediterranean Basin were well forested after the Classical era. 269 He argues that shipbuilding and land conversion in the Renaissance and Early Modern periods resulted in
more wide spread deforestation than during the classical era. This regional approach to
Mediterranean forests is a more appropriate way to examine Venice’s impact on its
mainland forests.
One of the best models of forest history is found altogether outside of European
history. Conrad Totman charted the progression of early modern Japanese forest law in
The Green Archipelago. Early modern Japan is an excellent example of a non-European
state responding to forest issues in a similar manner to Venice. Like Venice, Japan did
not fit the capitalist-driven environment of colonial New England put forth by William
Cronon and Carolyn Merchant. 270 Totman asserts that changes in agricultural practices
resulted in an increased use of forest products. 271 A similar pattern occurred in Venice
and was coupled with deforestation. Totman correctly asserts that “excessive
deforestation manifests itself in two ways: as wood scarcity and as environmental
deterioration.” 272 The Venetian sources suggest that ship-timber was a scarce resource
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that required protection for the sake of Venetian security. Environmental deterioration is
much harder to wring out of the sources.
A. T. Grove and Oliver Rackham staunchly oppose the basin-wide model of
Mediterranean deforestation. Grove and Rackham propose that the purported
deforestation in the Classical era and the Renaissance is part of a larger Mediterranean
“ruined landscape” myth. The ruined landscape myth can best be summarized as thus: in
the classical era, human use and pastoral livestock permanently deforested virgin stands
of Mediterranean forest. The deforestation caused severe soil erosion and the former lush
forestlands became as sterile as the thin soils of Illyria. 273 Although grossly simplified,
Grove and Rackham directly challenge J. Donald Hughes’s narrative of classical
environmental history. 274
Grove and Rackham challenged the basin-wide deforestation narrative through
their examination of ship-timber harvests throughout the Mediterranean in the
Renaissance era. They assert that the evidence for the decline in oaks in Terraferma is
inconclusive. The Venetians were simply outcompeted due to their outdated ship designs,
“poor dock layout, corrupt workforce, and inefficient management.” 275 Grove and
Rackham are excellent scholars and produced praiseworthy scholarship on environmental
change in England and Crete, but their assertions on Venice do not match what the
primary sources elicit about Venice’s timber situation. The Venetians were at the
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forefront of new ship designs, and possessed an extremely efficient dock layout. 276 Grove
and Rackham have neglected many of the Venetian primary sources that bluntly state that
Venice was experiencing a famine of ship oak. 277
My initial research suggests that regional deforestation of ship-timber is the most
appropriate model for pre-industrial Italy. Since the Venetian sources almost exclusively
focus on ship-timber, it is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to extrapolate overall
forest health. Deforestation of ship-timber certainly occurred in the Venetian hinterland,
but it is unwise to underestimate the resiliency of Mediterranean forests. The regional
deforestation of Venice’s timber resources is an overlooked factor that determined the
longevity of the Republic. However, larger economic and agricultural forces shifted the
Mediterranean trade networks against Venice. Silk’s movement west and the introduction
of maize removed Venice’s role as the middleman of the Mediterranean. 278
Recent scholars have also argued that regional deforestation in Renaissance Italy
is part of a widespread scarcity of oak throughout the Mediterranean basin. Faruk Tabak
asserted that regional deforestation of ship-timber species in Terraferma forced the
Venetians to seek timber from further afield. The scarcity of Venetian oaks was a smaller
part of a general decline in oaks throughout the Mediterranean basin. 279 According to
Tabak, deforestation was largely caused by new eastern crops changing agricultural land
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use patterns throughout the basin, coupled with a spike in population in between 14501560. 280
Studying the development of Venetian forest law also illustrated a need for more
inquiries into how forests influenced earlier historical narratives. The aforementioned
work by Russell Meiggs is the definitive work on ancient forests and timber. More
recently, Eugene Borza successfully illustrated that Athenian dependency of Macedonian
timber revealed the economic and political ties between Athens and Macedon. 281
Likewise, Lukas Thommen incorporated chapters devoted to Ancient forests in his An
Environmental History of the Ancient Greece and Rome. 282
Access to suitable supplies of timber appears to have encouraged the Athenians to
involve themselves with Macedon between the end of the second Greco-Persian War and
the start of the Second Peloponnesian War (the pentekontiaetia). According to
Theophrastus, the best species of conifers for all uses was the Silver Fir (Abies alba). 283
The Athenians constructed their triremes largely from conifers. The Spartans targeted
Athens’ supply of timber in a similar fashion as they destroyed Athenian wheat crops. 284
Brasidas’ decision to harvest timber near the Strymon for Spartan ships exacerbated the
defeat at Amphipolis in 422 BCE. 285 Jason, the capable cavalry commander of Pherai,
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later summarized Athenian timber needs by stating, “Consider now if I estimate rightly in
these matters also. For if we possess Macedon, the place from which the Athenians obtain
their timber, we will be able to build many more ships than they can.” 286 Although the
environment did not shape the ancient narrative alone, natural resources, especially
timber, exerted a perceivable influence on human actions.
A new environmental history of Venice is required to fully understand the
Venetian narrative. The domination of timber, water, salt, and wheat allowed Venice to
control Terraferma and the Adriatic. Each resource cannot be written out of the Venetian
narrative. The strategic outlook of the Venetian Empire cast its guise not only on the rich
waters of the east, but also the fertile forests of the Po River Valley.
Venetian wars with mainland polities and the Ottoman Empire helped to shape the
composition of Northeastern Italy’s forests. The Venetian forest narrative illustrates that
warfare directly impacts environmental systems. Modern warfare in troubled regions
such as Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan also shapes the sustainability of natural resources.
War is a constant theme in the human narrative and the development of Venetian forest
law provides historians with another window into how the environment and natural
resources can possess agency in historical events. Although there is an undeniable loss of
human life in conflicts, historians must also consider how military conflicts affect
resources that sustain societies.
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